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Abstract 
The impact of the Canterbury District Health Board structure on the efficiency 
and efficacy of clinical operations 
 
Objectives:   
The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the level of satisfaction from the 
clinical teams within the Canterbury District Health Board of the CDHB structure and its impact on 
the efficiency and efficacy of clinical operations. 
The objective of this research is to explore the healthcare system governance model in place for the 
CDHB and the clinicians’ view of the system for this region, with particular reference to the four key 
questions asked from a clinical perspective.  
 Should the system embrace greater centralisation or greater regionalisation? 
 Should the healthcare system be administered by a board or by management?  
 Should the administrative governance team be elected or appointed?  
 What degree of public participation should there be within the public healthcare system?    
These questions reflect the current stresses that affect the delivery of clinical services in the region. 
There are various factors affecting clinicians within the secondary healthcare sector. This paper 
reports on five critical influences on clinical practice and what effect they have on clinical operations: 
The Ministry of Health (MoH), the Canterbury District Health Board (CDHB) Board of Directors, 
District Health Board Management, the general public and other clinicians. Four pivotal overarching 
concepts relative to organisation structure serve as core organisational concepts:  the administrative 
distinction between the Boards and management, elected versus appointed membership, centralised 
versus decentralised structure and the degree of public participation in determining clinical practice.  
Methods:  Semi-structured interviews with a mixture of Clinical Directors and academic Heads of 
Departments from Christchurch central hospital were used to collect data. All management level 
clinicians were approached and asked to participate. Out of 37 requests, 27 agreed to participate. As 
part of the interview, participants were asked to respond to both rating scale measures and open 
ended questions about the nature of their work with and evaluation of the CDHB and its impact on 
clinical practice.    
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Results:  Clinicians saw public input to the CDHB as a having a positive effect, though the manner in 
which participation is achieved does not allow fair public representation. Management and clinicians 
are working closer together to effectively deliver healthcare for the region, though clinicians would 
like to have greater input on decisions at both management and Governmental levels. The impact 
the MoH has on clinical decisions is minimal yet clinicians would like more say in how the MoH makes 
those decisions. Rather than direct clinician input to MoH, there was a suggestion that the Council of 
Medical Colleges may be a better body to aid in the decision-making process for the MoH.  
Conclusion:  Though greater centralisation is taking place around certain aspects of healthcare, the 
regional system presently in place is viewed as preferable when compared to a fully centralised 
system the like of the NHS from the United Kingdom. Public participation is seen by the clinicians as 
an important aspect of a public healthcare system and this is presently achieved through an elected 
member to the Board. The manner in which publicly elected members are selected is presently not 
providing fair representation of the general public, nor does it result in elected Board members 
having the required skill sets needed to govern a DHB. The governance role could be performed by a 
mixture of elected and appointed members, but should also have some input from a central 
healthcare body. The present move by the primary healthcare sector within Canterbury could be an 
area of further research as a way to improve public input while addressing a lack of strategic, 
financial and clinical governance leadership that has been raised by academics and the government.     
 
Keywords:   Boards or Management, Elected or Appointed, Centralisation or Decentralisation, Public 
Participation in Healthcare.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
New Zealand can trace the creation of a Hospital Board System back to the 1885 Hospital  and 
Charitable Institutions Act (Dow, 1995). The Act stated that hospitals, managed by local boards, were 
to have sole “superintendence and control” of their institutions, while allowing boards to establish 
hospitals within their operational areas. The act was later amended in 1909 to say “control and 
management,” and was expanded to include maternity and convalescent homes, as well as sanatoria 
and institutions setup for substance abuse (Laugesen & Gauld, 2012, p. 15). 
The Board system stayed in place within New Zealand for close to 100 years, but came to an abrupt 
end when the National Party introduced The Health Reform Bill in July of 1991. This resulted in the 
scrapping of Boards, replacing them with acting commissioners, and the centralisation of the New 
Zealand Healthcare system. But this centralisation of New Zealand’s Healthcare system lasted just 
under ten years before it too was replaced.     
The present District Health Board (DHB) structure has been in place since the Labour-led coalition 
Government was elected to power in 1999 (Gauld, 2001). The coalition re-introduced public 
participation and involvement in the planning, governance and decision making process in the New 
Zealand healthcare system. Re-establishing Boards returned the New Zealand healthcare system to 
what had been characteristic of one of the oldest and longest established public healthcare systems. 
These changes re-established publicly elected Health Boards’ governance of healthcare delivery and 
removed the changes that the National Government had put in place only eight years earlier 
(Laugesen & Gauld, 2012). 
The coalition Government’s move to reintroduce public health boards was an attempt to rejuvenate 
public involvement in the healthcare system, while at the same time regionalising a system that had 
been centralised under the previous National led coalition Government (King, 2001). This 
decentralisation and re-introduction of public involvement went further in that it also introduced 
funding accountability as well as reviewing how the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi could be 
represented in both the delivery of healthcare, and the management structure of the Healthcare 
System (King, 2001).  
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The public Boards were to be made up of eleven members; four were to be nominated by the 
Minister of Health and seven to be elected from the local community. Following on from the 
inclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi principles, the government legislated that two of the Board 
members must come from the local iwi and would be listed as Maori members (Laugesen & Gauld, 
2012, p. 137). This system of governance has been in place now for over fifteen years.  
Within the Healthcare structure of New Zealand, a DHB is responsible for a large variety of 
healthcare providers delivering care to the New Zealand general public. A fuller description along 
with a pictorial layout of the entire New Zealand healthcare system can be found in Section 3.3. A 
simpler definition of a DHB is summarised with the following statement from the Ministry of Health 
(2011) :  
District health boards (DHBs) are responsible for providing or funding the 
provision of health services in their district 
This research is looking at the secondary healthcare system within Canterbury, New Zealand, but in 
doing so it does occasionally mention the primary healthcare sector. The following two quotes help 
to define the difference between these two healthcare sectors in New Zealand:  
Definition of Secondary care:  
[M]edical care that is provided by a specialist or facility upon referral by a 
primary care physician and that requires more specialized knowledge, skill, 
or equipment than the primary care physician can provide (“Secondary 
Care, ” 2016) 
The following definition of primary healthcare is taken from the MoH web site:       
Primary health care relates to the professional health care provided in the 
community, usually from a general practitioner (GP), practice nurse, 
pharmacist or other health professional working within a general practice 
(Ministry of Health, 2014c) 
 
1.1 Canterbury District Health Board    
The Canterbury District Health Board (CDHB) is New Zealand’s second largest health Board covering 
an area of 26,881 square kilometres and serving a population of just over 500,000 (Canterbury 
District Health Board, 2014a). It provides nearly 20 specialist services to the South Island, and four 
national or semi-national specialities.    
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To provide these services, the CDHB manages seven central hospitals, plus eight rural hospital 
facilities. While providing many of the secondary services from the hospitals and rural facilities the 
CDHB also runs a range of outreach clinics and community initiatives. Since 2015, the CDHB has 
taken responsibility for the delivery of healthcare services for the Chatham Islands, something that 
was previously provided by the Hawkes Bay DHB (Taylor, 2014).   
The CDHB has partnerships with many other agencies including local councils, Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Agency (CERA), Police and Justice, Housing NZ and the Ministries of Education 
and Social Development (Canterbury District Health Board, 2014a). They provide planning and 
funding for health services in Canterbury other than those provided to secondary care institutions. 
With the working arrangement via the Otago School of Medicine, the CDHB is one of the main 
tertiary providers of hospital and specialist services for the South Island.  
 
1.2 Clinical Efficiency  
Questions around clinical efficiency and efficacy are being raised by hospital managers, healthcare 
policy makers and medical research workers (Edwards, Silow-Carroll, & Lashbrook, 2011). One 
reason for this is the fact that hospital costs have increased to crisis proportions (Blendon et al, 
2002). Efficiency in a hospital service can be defined as the minimum set of inputs to produce 
successfully treated patients (Jon A Chilingerian & Sherman, 2004). Conversely, Cooper, Seiford, and 
Zhu (2011, p. 493) defined clinical inefficiency:  
Clinical inefficiency in the provision of hospital services occurs when a 
physician uses a relatively excessive quantity of clinical inputs when 
compared with physicians treating a similar case load and mix of patients. 
Once the minimum number of inputs for successful treatment are defined, the level of efficiency for 
clinicians may be measured, and using these results allows for greater analysis to be undertaken on 
the spiraling cost of hospital management and productivity. Ellis and McGuire, 1986 as cited in Jon A. 
Chilingerian (1995, p. 549) put forward the following:  
inefficient physician decision making may be one of the root causes of 
runaway costs and low hospital productivity.  
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1.3 Justification of this study 
There are very few studies that have looked at the role and significance of a publicly elected 
healthcare governance structure from the perspective of the clinician delivering the care to patients. 
This study has thus been designed to contribute to the literature on healthcare structure and its 
impact on clinical operations, as well as its relevance from a clinician’s perspective. In today’s 
healthcare system as hospitals become more centralised and ever more complex should the 
governance be performed by a Board many of whom do not have a clinical or healthcare related 
background, or by the management teams. Should a Board of governance be made up of locally 
elected members as a representation of the local population, or should these members by 
appointed from the best people capable of performing such a role regardless of locality. Should 
healthcare offered to the New Zealand public become more centralised, along the lines of the NHS in 
the UK or is a regionalised system better for New Zealand? Lastly, to what degree should the public 
participate in a public healthcare system?     
This research is likely to stimulate further discussions about public involvement in the governance 
and management of healthcare delivery and greater centralisation or decentralisation of New 
Zealand healthcare management. Findings from this study should allow for and generate additional 
research on management structures within the secondary healthcare system. The uses for, and 
methods of incorporating the public into the operation of the New Zealand healthcare system. As 
well as the impacts that greater or lesser centralisation of services can have on healthcare delivery. 
Regarding the administrative running of the healthcare system, a board structure for management 
raises many as yet unanswered questions about the ability of boards to perform to the standards 
required to govern what is seen as the largest employer in Christchurch, as well as one of the more 
complex and costliest organisations in New Zealand.  Whether boards should be elected or 
appointed, depends on the intended role of the board. If the role is to gain public representation, 
then this may require some form of public election for the board members. For the smaller DHBs 
within New Zealand, having a limited population may result in few people on the board with the 
skills required to perform the roles when putting themselves forward in the election process. This in 
turn may leave the DHB management in a position of isolation while the DHB has to engage training 
for those board members before they are able to offer any governance direction and support.  
Much of the literature focussed on healthcare structure provides mixed views but no definitive 
solution to the question of centralisation or regionalisation for healthcare delivery (Rico & Léon, 
2005). If the healthcare system was centralised there would be no need for locally elected boards, 
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but their elimination may result in the loss of public involvement in the running and management in 
what is seen as a public healthcare system.  
 
1.4 Research Objective and Questions    
The objective of this research is to explore the healthcare system governance model in place for the 
CDHB and the clinicians’ view of the system for this region. The four key questions noted below 
cannot be answered directly, though the purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of 
the level of satisfaction from the clinical teams at Christchurch hospital with the CDHB Board, the 
CDHB structure and its perceived impact on the efficiency and efficacy of clinical operations. The 
conclusion of this research will report on what the clinicians said regarding these questions:  
 Should the system embrace greater centralisation or greater regionalisation? 
 Should the healthcare system be administered by a board or management?  
 Should the administrative governance team be elected or appointed?  
 What degree of public participation should there be within the public healthcare system?    
These questions reflect the current stresses that affect the delivery of clinical services in the region. 
There are several reasons why the present setting, Christchurch, is appropriate for investigating the 
role and performance of the DHBs. The CDHB is the largest of the DHBs within the South Island. It is 
the second largest in New Zealand and has the widest range of services available to the public of the 
South Island. Because many of the speciality services cannot be operated fully outside of 
Christchurch, many of the Senior Medical Officer (SMOs) run outreach clinics for the smaller DHBs. 
As they often operate outside the CDHB boundaries, these clinicians are in a good position to review 
the structure and its effect on clinical efficiency and compare this to other DHBs in New Zealand. For 
many, this comparison can be expanded to include other healthcare structures and systems they 
have worked in around the world.  
The relationships amongst the various health care stakeholders in New Zealand can be presented 
pictorially. Five central stakeholder groups were identified, each with some ability to affect clinical 
operations. These were: The Ministry of Health (MoH), the DHB Board of Directors, the DHB 
Management, the public and clinicians. The relationships amongst these are graphically presented in 
Figure 1 below.     
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Figure 1 - Influences on Clinical Operations 
 
The viewpoints of clinicians as stakeholders within the healthcare system were collected and 
analysed. This information was then sorted into the following four areas of concern:  
 Boards or Management  
 Elected or Appointed  
 Centralised or Decentralised  
 Public Participation  
 
Once the information was sorted into the four areas of concern, it was again analysed with the 
intention of answering the thesis questions outlined above.  
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1.5 Research Approach 
A case study of the clinicians at Christchurch Hospital, Canterbury, New Zealand was undertaken. 
The format used in this thesis was semi-structured in-depth interviews with both quantitative and 
qualitative questioning, yielding both numeric data and verbal interviewee responses. This approach 
was used to allow participants to focus on specific topics, yet still enabling them to provide some 
degree of depth in their responses.  The questionnaire was created and split into six sections, five 
core influences affecting clinical practice, and the final section asking demographic and personal 
questions. Those sections were: 
 CDHB Board and your relationship with members 
 CDHB Management  
 The Ministry of Health 
 Public engagement 
 Your experiences of different Health models  
 Personal question     
 
The interviews were spread over a number of weeks and were conducted by the author.    
 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organised into six chapters. Chapter one introduces the basic outline for this research, 
the justification, objectives and thesis questions posed. It defines the approach that will be taken 
and outlines how that will be reflected upon within this document.    
Chapter Two introduces the healthcare system within New Zealand, how this came about, and some 
of the changes the New Zealand healthcare system has undergone over the past 100 years. It looks 
in greater detail at the two major healthcare reforms, the first being the 1991 Healthcare Reform Bill 
that centralised the healthcare system and removed public Boards. The second of these, the Health 
and Disabilities Act in 2000, reintroduced regionalisation and returned public Boards to the 
governance role of DHBs.    
Chapter Three goes on to discuss New Zealand’s healthcare structure, breaking this down into two 
main areas; structures within the secondary healthcare system and the many different facets within 
this, and the encompassing healthcare structure within New Zealand.  
Chapter Four expands on qualitative and quantitative research, content analysis and structured 
interviews, the interview layout, the interview schedule and the selection and size of the group of 
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clinicians selected for interviewing. It explains both the development of the interviews as well as the 
questionnaire used in the interviews and how this was amended after a trial was run in one of the 
hospital departments. An analysis was also done on the CDHB board meeting minutes so there is a 
section covering why and how this was performed.     
Chapter Five first analyses the CDHB board meetings, then gives a breakdown of the main 
questionnaire results in the six segments from the questionnaire: The CDHB Board and clinicians 
relationship with members, CDHB management, The Ministry of Health, Public engagement, 
Clinicians experience of different health models and personal questions.  
Chapter Six discusses the key findings of this thesis and sets out the conclusions and implications 
based on the results presented in Chapter Five. This is split back into the four segments matching the 
four thesis questions: Boards or Management, Elected or Appointed, Centralised of Decentralised 
and Public Participation.  The summary then goes on to answer the thesis questions, while the final 
segments note the contribution this thesis makes to the literature, the limitations of the study and 
areas of further research. 
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Chapter 2  
History of Healthcare in New Zealand 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a historical overview of public healthcare within New Zealand since its creation 
with the Hospitals and Charitable Institutions Act 1885. It goes on to highlight some of the changes 
to the healthcare system and what impact these had on the healthcare structure and organisation. 
An understanding of the current situation of the District Health Boards, and how this impacts the 
efficiency and efficacy of clinical operations requires an examination of the history of the DHB 
structure in New Zealand. This goes back to the very foundation of public healthcare in New Zealand 
in 1885 and why New Zealand felt a need to introduce such a structure.  
Two major changes are considered. First, the move from a regionalised organisation to a centrally 
managed system. Second, the reversal of the centralisation and the re-introduction of a regional 
organisation of healthcare with public engagement in the form of Boards of Governance for each of 
the District Health Boards. Between these two changes, there was a period at the CDHB that has 
been referred to as “the Bad Old Days” (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #1, 2015), where 
amendments to the clinical practices at the Christchurch hospital resulted in the deaths of three 
patients.  
            
2.2 Historical Overview 
For much of the early 19th century, healthcare within New Zealand was a mixture “old wives’ tales”; 
home remedies mixed with folk and patent medicines. A visit to a Doctor was for many a rare event 
and treatment would often be given to family members, children and neighbours by women 
(usually) who were seen as having healing skills of sorts, much of which may have been learnt 
through midwifery. In comparison, doctors (the vast majority being male) owing to their educational 
or social status, may only have been summoned to help ease the pain of the dying.  
With improvements to medicine in the later part of the 19th century, and the establishment of the 
Otago Medical school in 1875, doctors started to take a greater role within healthcare delivery. Local 
hospitals became more popular as common standards of practice amongst medical practitioners 
were applied. In 1886 The New Zealand Medical Association was created and referred to as the New 
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Zealand branch of the British Medical Association. Yet the birth of the New Zealand National Health 
System can be seen as in 1900, with the introduction of the Public Health Act. This article of 
legislation removed responsibility from local authorities to a new Department of Public Health 
(Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2014a). It was not until New Zealand suffered its worst disease 
outbreak in the flu pandemic of 1918, resulting in the death of over 8,600 people (Ministry for 
Culture and Heritage, 2014b), that a coordinated response to national healthcare was created. In the 
two months between October and December 1918, New Zealand lost half as many people to 
influenza as were killed during the entire period of The First World War (Ministry for Culture and 
Heritage, 2014b). At the time the public of New Zealand sought answers to this crisis, and the 
government responded. The acting Chief Health Officer, Robert Makgill, was key to developing and 
implemented the 1920 Health Act that was described as “the most useful legacy of the pandemic” 
(Rice & Bryder, 2005). Rice and Bryder went on to say that this legislation designed by Robert 
Makgill: 
... was so well drafted that it survived with only minor amendments until 
the 1956 Health Act, which itself still followed the general pattern of the 
1920 Act. At the time it was widely recognised as a model piece of health 
legislation, said to be the best of its kind in the English language. 
  
The following statement is taken from a speech given by the Minister of Health, The Honourable 
James Alexander Young, in 1926.  
Our hospital Board system has been described as being politically 
controlled... It is public control by elective Boards under departmental 
supervision and assistance. It is a true expression of our democratic free 
institutions. (“Defended by Minister”, 1926) 
The visionary principles of the New Zealand healthcare system were later defined within the Social 
Security Act 1938:  
[H]ealthcare access should be universal and free from financial and other 
barriers, that all New Zealanders should have equal access to the same 
standard of treatment, and that the health system should be integrated 
and preventive rather than curative in focus (Gauld, 2014). 
Since 1885, when the Hospitals and Charitable Institutions Act was enacted, allowing Boards to 
establish hospitals in their districts, the basic structure of partially appointed and partially elected 
hospital governance boards has remained largely intact (Laugesen & Gauld, 2012). This is not to say 
various governments have not tried to overturn the public Board structure. Table 1 is extracted from 
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Laugesen and Gauld and shows various re-structures and reforms going back to the 1920s, where 
the plans were very often aimed at overthrowing the publicly elected board governance system, and 
centralising the many smaller, rural hospitals that had developed around New Zealand (Laugesen & 
Gauld, 2012) 
Table 1 – Major Health System reforms 
Reform Period Policy Recommendations Outcome 
1928 to 1932 
A Board of Hospitals to 
manage the hospital system 
No Policy Changes 
1935 to 1942 
Social Security Act 
Health benefits for primary 
and hospital care, plus minor 
changes to hospitals.  
Laissez-faire hospital financing 
policies  
1952 to 1953 
Commission on Hospital 
reform  
Boards to be split into 
appointed and elected. 
Introduction of five regional 
Health Authorities.  
1957 legislation did not change 
hospital governance  
1971 – 1972 
Royal Commission on Hospital 
Services  
Abolishment of the Royal 
Commission  
A change in Government 
resulted in the abolishment of 
The Commission 
1972 to 1975  
Labour Caucus Committee  
Amend / remove the elected 
representation of hospital 
Boards, introduction of 
Regional Health Boards  
No policy changes  
1976 to 1984   
Special Advisory Committee 
on Hospital System 
Organisation  
Amend / remove the elected 
representation of hospital 
Boards, introduction of 
Regional Health Boards  
Voluntary regionalisation 
policy 
1986 to 1987 
Health Benefits Review  
The introduction of regional 
Area Health Boards 
No direct policy changes  
1987 to 1990   
Hospital and Related Services 
Taskforce  
Six regional Health Authorities, 
elected members on the 
Boards, introduction of 
competition for provisioning, 
internal market.    
Indirectly lead to the 1989 
Area Health Boards Act, 
restructuring down from 29 
Boards to 14 
1991 to 1993 
Health Services Taskforce  
The removal of Area Health 
Boards, the removal of elected 
health governance Boards, the 
Introduction of competition for 
provisioning and financing. 
Elected governing Boards were 
abolished. Internal markets 
were created. Four regional 
purchasers and one national 
purchaser were created.     
1996 to 2000 
Coalition Government 
agreement introduces a 
process for a single national 
Health Funding agency.   
Remove commercialisation of 
healthcare, and re-introduce 
regionalisation of healthcare 
management  
2000  
Introduction of District Health 
Boards. Reintroduce elected 
healthcare governance. Local 
DHBs to be responsible for 
planning and purchasing.   
Creation of DHBs, publicly 
elected healthcare governance 
model.     
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(Laugesen & Gauld, 2012, p. 14) 
Table 2 shows how the amendments and changes to the New Zealand healthcare structure have 
reduced the number of healthcare providers from 46 in 1925 to 20 in 2010, representing some 
centralisation of healthcare. The table also links the time periods to specific Health reform.  
Table 2 – Number of Healthcare Boards over time 
Number of 
Healthcare  
Boards in NZ 
Year Health reform 
46 1925   
45 1935 Social Security Act  
42 1940   
37 1951 Hospital Reform Commission  
37 1960   
31 1970 
Royal Commission & Labour caucus 
committee 
 
29 1975 Special Advisory committee  
29 1980   
29 1985 Health Benefits Review  
29 1988 Hospital Taskforce  
14 1989   
23 1991 
Health Service Taskforce & Health 
Funding Agency 
 
21 2000 
Creation of DHBs and elected 
representation for Boards 
 
20 2010   
(Laugesen & Gauld, 2012, p. 17) 
During the past 100 years of reform to the healthcare structure, there is little evidence that any of 
these changes have been initiated from the bottom upwards. In this case the “bottom” would be the 
healthcare professionals and consumers of the health system in New Zealand (Bloom & Guest, 
2001). The New Zealand Medical Council have supported the reduction of Board numbers even 
though they have been very vocal in their disagreement with the government regarding the methods 
and changes forced on the health system over the last century (Laugesen & Gauld, 2012).   
In the United States of America (USA), the Kaiser Permanente organization of California has a 
resident population of 8.7 million people (Gauld, 2001). Yet New Zealand, with a population of just 
over 4.4 million people (Statistics New Zealand, 2013) has 20 secondary healthcare systems, all of 
which need to maintain a full board and management structure, yet only four of these districts 
(Waitemata, Auckland, Counties Manukau and Canterbury) have populations in excess of 400,000 
residents. The DHB population figures for New Zealand are displayed in Table 3.    
13 
 
Table 3 – District Health Board by population 
Healthcare Area Population 
Waitemata 525,555 
Canterbury 482,178 
Counties Manukau 469,293 
Auckland 436,341 
Waikato 359,310 
Southern 297,423 
Capital and Coast 283,704 
Bay of Plenty 205,995 
Mid Central 162,564 
Hawkes Bay 151,692 
Northland 151,692 
Hutt Valley 138,378 
Nelson Marlborough 136,995 
Taranaki 109,752 
Lakes 98,187 
Whanganui 60,120 
South Canterbury 55,626 
Tairawhiti 43,653 
Wairarapa 41,112 
West Coast 32,148 
Outside a DHB 324 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2014)  
The low population for many of the smaller DHBs is problematic. In the UK this has been identified 
as one of the key factors in a lack of board members with the desired skills, competencies, 
experience, knowledge and ability to represent their local constituency (Barnes, Newman, Knops, & 
Sullivan, 2003). Over the last decade, the National Health System for the UK has tried to increase 
public participation in decision making and planning. Yet the experience of the Primary Care Groups 
(PCGs) points to an overall lack of guidance provided by many public boards regardless of the 
members’ diverse backgrounds or experience, which ultimately results in uncertainty (Rowe & 
Shepherd, 2002). The New Zealand MoH has noted concerns about the capacity of DHB Boards to 
govern effectively, with particular emphasis given to members not having the required skills to drive 
performance improvements, especially financial performance (Birchfield & Mueller, 2010). Within 
Canterbury, this lack of experience in the areas of leadership, financial, healthcare and strategic 
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planning for Canterbury’s largest employer, is leaving the CDHB in a position where the Board is seen 
as unable to drive the innovation. These innovative ideas are needed to help the CDHB grow in this 
important phase of re-construction since the earthquakes left so many healthcare facilities beyond 
repair. This lack of ideas and vision has been raised by Laugesen and Gauld (2012, p. 150) who goes 
on to highlight the vacuum DHB management teams work in as Boards are not in a position to offer 
the guidance expected from them:      
[C]hief executives say that they often work in a vacuum; having to educate 
the Board about issues facing the DHB, while making decisions that the 
Board is not adequately equipped to discuss in any depth (Laugesen & 
Gauld, 2012, p. 150). 
With all the discussions around centralised or decentralised governance for the health system, there 
is no definitive study of public participation in a health system showing either the costs or benefits of 
any local input (El Ansari & Andersson, 2011).  
 
2.3 Centralisation: The Healthcare Reform Bill 1991.   
In politics, the year 1991 marked a significant shift in how the health care system was viewed. After 
close to 100 years of public involvement in the country’s healthcare service, Boards were removed 
and replaced with acting commissioners. The changes to the healthcare system implemented by the 
National Government in 1991 went further than just centralising healthcare management, 
introducing market oriented reforms, and thereby challenged the long accepted values of a freely 
accessible public health system and the underlying assumption of a universal healthcare structure 
(Laugesen & Gauld, 2012, p. 120). 
The Right Honourable Simon Upton, Minister of Health, introduced the Health Reform Bill on the 
30th of July with the following opening statement:  
The health system is unfair. It discriminates between victims of accidents 
and illness, between those using primary care systems and those using 
secondary care services, and poses significant access difficulties for those 
on modest to low incomes. It is also inefficient. There are perverse 
incentives that lead to cost-shifting. There is evidence that capital 
investments are being run down because of the reluctance to take urgent 
decisions, and there is a duplication of effort among the public sector, the 
private sector and voluntary sectors. On the other hand, we have a pool of 
talented health professionals who, given the chance, are capable of 
providing even better healthcare to the population at large (Molteno, 
1991) 
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medications and the complexity of treatment plans was resulting in spiralling costs, and 
some of those costs could and should be shared with the public when and where possible.  
2. Public participation. The opposition asked how, with a centralised system and the removal of 
public interaction through the Boards, could healthcare be classified as a public healthcare 
system? The perception must now be that of a wholly government run system, centralised 
and managed from Wellington, offering healthcare to the public of New Zealand, but with 
no public input or participation on how the system was to be delivered or managed.  
3. Oversight. Covered the areas that included a lack of planning, lack of consent, lack of 
accountability, lack of select committee input, lack of submissions and a perceived lack of 
submission time. Many of these points were put forward by the opposition benches in an 
attempt to highlight how the government had overlooked what was seen as due diligence.   
4. Centralisation versus decentralisation. Discussions on how the New Zealand healthcare 
system may become more aligned to that in the United Kingdom with a central healthcare 
system. The government put forward that centralisation was seen as a way to remove one 
layer of local bureaucracy while also allowing some form of central monitoring. The 
opposition benches countered these points saying centralisation would remove local control 
and reduce the ability of the local healthcare system to react to local issues and events. 
Centralisation would not be able to reduce the overall bureaucracy within the New Zealand 
healthcare system, this would only result in healthcare being bogged down in a central 
bureaucratic system that was unable to cope.   
5. Funding. For such a shift in the overall concept of the New Zealand healthcare system, the 
opposition claimed that there was not enough money going into healthcare. That funding for 
the healthcare system was not adequate to provide the services that New Zealand’s 
expected. The government put forward that these changes would generate saving within the 
system that would result more funding available to other areas of healthcare. The 
introduction of the provider and funder separation would allow greater commercialisation 
and competition within the system, which would again help to drive down cost and save 
money. The opposition benches countered this claiming that separation of the funder and 
provider would only create a situation resulting in spiralling cost.      
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2.4 The Bad Old Days at Canterbury Health Limited  
Canterbury Health Limited (CHL) was one of the Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) operating within 
the Christchurch district, along with HealthLink South, during the centralisation of healthcare 
introduced in 1991. In August 1995, the CHL Board announced a restructuring of nursing staff that 
reduced the number of charge nurses employed at the Christchurch central hospital and planned to 
introduce case management for the remaining nursing staff. This would enable less experienced 
nurses to replace highly skilled nursing officers, providing they following the planned case 
management instruction books that were to be produced by CHL (Gowland & Bagshaw, 2013). In 
September of the same year, the Canterbury Association of Physicians wrote an open letter to The 
Press expressing their concern over the nursing restructure (Loaefa, 1995). Thus, began a very public 
disagreement between the hospital clinicians and the management and Board of CHL. In November, 
the Canterbury Association of Physicians again used The Press to publicly criticise CHL management 
for ignoring the clinicians’ professional advice. They stated that the clinicians had lost confidence in 
the chairman of CHL, Mr. Brent Layton, the Chief Executive Officer Mr. Ian Frame and the general 
manager of Christchurch hospital, Mr. John Coughlin.  
This Association has lost confidence in Dr Brent Layton, Chairman of 
Canterbury Health, and his Board because of their failure to obtain the 
funding necessary for this tertiary and training centre to maintain its 
clinical services to the people of Canterbury…We have also lost confidence 
in [Chief Executive] Mr. Ian Frame and his management group who 
proposed major changes which will have a deleterious effect on the 
delivery of clinical care in Christchurch and now plan to implement them 
irrespective of “consultation”… The Board and management have imposed 
an approach to planning which ignores health professional advice, has 
undermined standards and morale, involves the suspension of services and 
is not in the best interests of the provision of health care in Christchurch 
(Loaefa, 1995). 
Over the next four months letters were published from the Board Chairman, Mr. Brent Layton, 
publicly  rejecting the claims put forward by the Canterbury Association of Physicians, and hospital 
medical staff voicing their concerns over the proposed staffing changes (Gilling, 1995). Table 4 on 
page 18 contains a summary of events from December 1995 to February 1997.  
During these disputes between the clinicians at CHL and the management and Board, the deaths of 
three patients (Mr. Fonoti in October 1996,  Mr. Gardiner in September 1996 and Mrs. Malcolm in 
June 1996) were used as an illustration of the inadequacy of the standard of care (Stent, 1998). The 
style of management at CHL was seen as being so caustic it created an environment of distrust which 
ultimately resulted in inappropriate standards of care for patients. As a result of this lack of co-
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ordination and respect between management and clinicians, patients were unable to receive the 
appropriate quality of care required to save lives. This was especially true during the winter months 
of 1996, when a greater number of sick and elderly reported to the Emergency Department at 
Christchurch Hospital.  
The [Christchurch central] Hospital was so unsafe during the winter of 1996 
it was a miracle that more people did not die (“A Damning Report,” 1998).  
The Commissioner of Health and Disabilities, Robyn Stent, was forced to run an official investigation 
into CHL after receiving numerous reports alleging unsafe practices at Christchurch hospital (Stent, 
1998). This included a report from the The Christchurch Hospital Medical Staff Associaction (CHMSA) 
entitled  “Patients Are Dying” (Christchurch Hospital Medical Staff Associaction, 1998). The Health 
and Disability commissioners’ investigation was commissioned under the 1994 Health and 
Disabilities Act, and was subject to a judicial review in the Christchurch High Court in early March of 
1997, which was later upheld.  The commissioner’s investigation was to consider whether the 
actions taken by Canterbury Health Limited during the winter of 1996 at the Christchurch central 
Hospital were in breach of the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights with special 
emphasis placed on Right 4, the Right to Services of an Appropriate Standard. The Stent report was 
released by the Health and Disability Commissioner in 1998 and opened with the following 
comment:     
In my opinion certain actions of Canterbury Health Limited were in breach 
of the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 1(2), Right 
4(1), Right 4(2), Right 4(5) and Right 10 of the Code (Stent, 1998, p. 77).  
This statement was part of a hard-hitting report that went on to list over 65 recommendations for 
change that needed to take place within the Christchurch hospital. At the heart of the issues 
outlined by the report was the lack of leadership provided by both the management team and the 
Board of the Area Health Board.  On this very point, Robyn Stent noted:   
In my opinion there was a lack of decisiveness and leadership at 
Canterbury Health… The Board should have recognised in 1995 that the 
Chief Executive could not lead the organisation through the change process 
(Stent, 1998, p. 93) 
These comments were not reserved solely for management and the Board. She also went on to state 
the following regarding the clinical staff: 
Leadership has also not been demonstrated by some senior medical staff, 
despite their professional status (Stent, 1998, p. 93) 
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In 1997, the leadership and management structure for the Christchurch hospital was restructured 
for the third time in less than six years. These management changes were directly attributed to the 
lack of open communication between management and clinical staff, to a lack of a clear and decisive 
direction and actions and a lack of leadership with a sense and strength of conviction required to 
drive forward change (Stent, 1998). Not only was this loss of leadership evident in in the 
management of Christchurch hospital, but at the time of the “Patients Are Dying” report from the 
CHMSA, it was evident that it was also lacking from the Board of CHL (Stent, 1998). Stent went on to 
note the breakdown between management and clinical staff: 
As a result of this lack of co-ordination and respect between management 
and clinicians, patients did not receive appropriate quality care, particularly 
in the 1996 winter months (Stent, 1998, p. 86).    
A summarized timeline of public events that led to a change in leadership of Christchurch Hospital is 
shown in the table below. 
Table 4 - Summary of events from December 1995 to February 1997 (The Press)  
December 1995 Over 60 medical staff members write to the Minister of Crown Health 
Enterprises and the Minster of Health expressing deep concerns about the 
loss of public confidence in Canterbury Health.  
February 1996 The Royal Australasian College of Surgeons supports the Canterbury 
clinicians in the claim that restructuring poses a threat to patient safety. 
April 1996 A poll of 155 Doctors showed over overwhelming support for the 
Surgeons’ concerns over restructuring.  
May 1996 Chairman of the Crown Health Association Mr. Brent Leyton rejects the 
idea of a clinical Planning and Policy Committee put forward by the 
Medical Staff Association.   
July 1996 An advertisement in The Press reads:  “Who do you want to make 
decisions about your medical care ... A Doctor of Medicine or a Doctor of 
Economics?” 
July 1996 Chief Executive Officer Mr. Ian Frame resigns 
October 1996 Chairman of the Crown Health Association Mr. Brent Layton resigns 
February 1997  
Christchurch Hospital General Manager Mr. John Coughlin resigns (Gilling, 
1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d, 1996e, 1996f, 1996g, 1996h, 
1996i, 1997a, 1997b) 
 
2.5 De-centralisation: New Zealand Health and Disabilities Act, August 2000 
One of the many new policies introduced by the Labour-led Government was the reorganisation of 
the healthcare system. Annette King, Minister of Health, introduced the New Zealand Health and 
Disabilities Act to the House on the 17th August 2000 with the following statement: 
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Today is a historic day for New Zealand health, because it marks the formal 
beginning of a return to a genuine public health service for this country.  I 
am proud to be the Minister of Health in a Government that is determined, 
through this bill, to restore public ownership of the health system. That 
said, the enormity of the job ahead in creating a health service that New 
Zealanders can trust again cannot be overestimated (Molteno, 2001) 
After nearly ten years of a centralised government administered healthcare system without public 
boards, the healthcare service of New Zealand was regionalised with each region governed by a 
board of eleven members, made up of seven publicly elected and four government appointed board 
members. A range of issues within the three readings of the Health and Disabilities Act in the House 
of Parliament on the 17th of August, the 23rd November and the 7th of December 2000 featured 
repeatedly. These frequencies of occurrence in the debates are presented in Figure 3 in the same 
manner as the 1991 Healthcare Reform Bill from Figure 2.  
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regional system with a Board, management and clinical input, who would ultimately be accountable 
and who are they accountable too.  Overall, the two-main points within public participation centred 
around scaremongering tactics from the opposition benches and the reintroduction of fairness for all 
New Zealanders put forward by the government. The introduction of the Health and Disabilities Act 
allowed the government to introduce Maori representation within the Boards, as well as 
encompassing Treaty of Waitangi principles allowing greater cultural awareness within healthcare 
delivery. The government legislated that two of the Board members must come from the local iwi 
and would be listed as Maori members (Laugesen & Gauld, 2012, p. 137).  The rationale for 
decentralising the health system was the same message used for the past 100 years: Local decision 
making structures facilitate closeness to the community (Gauld, 2001).  
Many of those opposed to the centralised structure claimed that for the NHS centralisation had 
failed to provide the feeling of community-led healthcare, providing for the community’s needs and 
allowing for community input to the decision making process (Barnes et al., 2003; Pfeffer, 1995) and 
this was not something New Zealand should emulate. The new healthcare policy envisioned a 
national healthcare system led by the public sector and based on a philosophy of cooperation where 
health system relationships should encourage patient and community-centred behaviour (Segall, 
2000). 
By decentralising the New Zealand healthcare system and introducing democratisation the regional 
healthcare system would be accountable to the local resident population. Within New Zealand, 
however, this is not the case as the Boards are in the first instance fully accountable to central 
government, yet it is the appearance of a democratic system that was seen as being important to 
the local population of New Zealand (Laugesen & Gauld, 2012, p. 165). This raises the question of 
whether the local elected board is nothing more than a rubber stamping forum for centralised 
government and that it does not represent the needs of the local population (Laugesen & Gauld, 
2012, p. 141). 
 
2.6 New Zealand Healthcare system post the Health and Disability act 
Greater involvement of hospital clinicians has encouraged a much greater emphasis on both clinical 
governance as well as greater clinical leadership. Both themes are central to the report from a 
Ministerial Review Group to the Minister of Health 2009 (Horn Report, 2009). This report made the 
following recommendations centred around nine key themes 
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1. New models of care which see the patient rather than the institution at the centre of service 
delivery and which aim to promote a more seamless patient journey across community, 
primary, and hospital sectors, greater use of primary and community care, and the shifting 
of care “closer to home”.   
2. Stronger clinical and management partnerships to ensure that doctors, nurses, and other 
health professionals play a key role in decision-making.  
3. A sharper focus on patient safety and quality of care to ensure better results for patients and 
more services for the resources that are available.  
4. Identifying the services people need to bring a more measured, safer and more nationally 
uniform approach to the introduction of new medical technology and new clinical 
procedures.  
5. Putting the right services in the right place by ensuring that the sector is configured – 
nationally, regionally, and locally – to best meet the needs of New Zealanders.  
6. Ensuring the right capacity is in place for the future by improving structures and processes 
for workforce, capital, and IT planning and funding.  
7. Building a sustainable workforce to ensure that we have planned and developed a workforce 
that meets our future needs.  
8. Shifting resources to the front-line by reducing the cost of “back office” shared services for 
DHBs and reducing the duplication of functions carried out across the country.  
9. Improving hospital productivity by reducing the variation in clinical and financial 
performance within and between hospitals, so they can do more with the resources 
available to them (Horn Report, 2009, p. 4). 
 
To help achieve the goals put forward in the Ministerial Review, the government set up the National 
Health Board (NHB) in 2009. This agency operated independently from both central government and 
the Ministry of Health, having its own Chief Executive and a separate governing board made up of a 
mix of general practitioners, senior physicians and nursing representatives from around the country, 
along with two experienced members from the business community. Though the NHB was created 
to operate outside of government, up to half of the staff taken on at the new NHB were serving 
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members of the MoH. Even though the NHB was a separate entity from the MoH, it still took its 
direction in the same manner as the DHB Boards, so its independence can be questioned in the same 
manner as the Boards of the DHBs.  
The following are taken directly from the MoH website:  
The National Health Board (NHB) was a whole-of-system health planning, 
advice and funding organisation made up of a Board appointed by the 
Minister of Health and supported by the National Health Board Business 
Unit within the Ministry of Health... The NHB was disestablished in March 
2016…The NHB’s functions, including annual and regional funding, 
monitoring and planning of DHBs, and national service planning and 
funding have been reabsorbed back into the Ministry of Health (Ministry of 
Health, 2016a).  
Within the Horn report there was a greater emphasis on patient care, stronger clinical and 
management partnerships, along with improvements in patient safety and quality of care. These 
were also some of the goal set out for the NHB, yet studies suggest medical errors affect around 
twelve per cent of patients in New Zealand and could account for up to 30 per cent of healthcare 
expenditure (Davis et al., 2002). Improvements to patient safety and the quality of care has the 
potential to not only decrease the rate of errors, to improve the patient journey through the 
healthcare process, but also to save millions of dollars per year and something the NHB were initially 
looking into.  The CDHB revenue from the Ministry of Health for the operational year ending on the 
30th June 2012 was $1,369,837,000 and $1,417,954,000 in 2013 (Audit New Zealand, 2012, 2013). If 
the figures put forward by Davis et al are correct, there may be potential savings up to and over 
$410 million a year within the CDHB.   
The graphs in figure 4 below shows both the average spending on health per capita and the total 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP. New Zealand is spending the least per capital out of the 12 
counties shown, but has since 1987 / 88 overtaken the UK in total expenditure on health as a 
percentage of GDP. From 2003 until 2006 the total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP 
rose overtaking both Australia and Norway. What does show very clearly is an enormous difference 
between the per capita spending of public healthcare system, the likes of New Zealand, Australia 
and the United Kingdom, and the system in place within the USA who spend around $7,300 US to 
New Zealand spending around $2,300 US for the same period. Yet since 2000 until 2007 the average 
spending per capita in both the USA and New Zealand has nearly doubled.              
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Figure 4 - International Comparison of Spending on Health 1980 - 2007 (Matherson, 2011) 
 
2.7 Chapter Summary  
From the initial introduction of the public healthcare system in New Zealand in 1885, the structure 
of healthcare has gone through many changes. At one point the regionalised healthcare system was 
made up of 46 boards of control, was reduced to 14 by 1989 and increased to 23 by 1991. This has 
now settled at 20 after the merger of Southland and Otago DHBs created the Southern DHB in 2010. 
The New Zealand healthcare system was governed by Boards of control from 1885 up to 1991 when 
the National Government removed the Boards altogether while at the same centralising the New 
Zealand healthcare system. During this centralisation period Christchurch hospital went through 
numerous restructures that resulted in the deaths of three patients in 1996 (Stent, 1998) and saw 
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clinicians and management in open conflict that was reported in the local newspaper. These conflicts 
came to a climax in the second half of 1996 when the CEO and Chairman of the CHA resigned to be 
followed early in 1997 by the resignation of General Manager of the Christchurch hospital.   
Centralisation of healthcare in New Zealand lasted until August of 2000 when the Labour-Alliance 
government re-established regionalisation of healthcare and reintroduced Boards of governance to 
the New Zealand healthcare system.   
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Chapter 3 
Organisational Structure 
3.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter presented a historical background of the healthcare system in New Zealand 
and how this impacted the care of patients at the Christchurch central hospital.  This chapter 
examines the role of DHBs in two segments. The first segment presents various aspects of secondary 
healthcare structure and function, along with their relationship to management and the impact 
these have on a healthcare system in general. Eight subsections cover the five core topics of this 
thesis: Boards vs management, elected versus appointed memberships, centralised versus 
decentralised structures and the degree of public participation. Three further subsections cover the 
role of Boards, how the NHS in England looked to reform public engagement and whether 
competition is healthy in the provisioning of healthcare. The second segment looks at the overall 
healthcare structure in place within New Zealand.  
 
3.2 Structures within the Secondary Healthcare System 
3.2.1 The Role of the Board 
The Board of the Canterbury District Health Board has eleven members. Seven are elected and four 
are appointed by the Minister of Health. Board members are ultimately accountable to the Minister 
of Health for the performance of their DHB, even though they are the representatives for the local 
public.  
The Board is responsible to the Minister of Health for the overall 
performance and management of the DHB. The Board's core responsibility 
is to set strategic direction and policy that is consistent with Government 
objectives, improves health outcomes and ensures sustainable service 
provision. The Board also ensures compliance with legal and accountability 
requirements and maintains relationships with the Minister of Health, 
Parliament and the Canterbury community (Canterbury District Health 
Board, 2014b). 
A recent study by Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) looked at eleven Israeli Government business 
companies and found that Boards can be split into one of two distinct types. The first was described 
as a supervisory or monitoring role, the second as a more active managerial approach.  As the 
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Boards of the New Zealand’s healthcare system are a mixture of publicly  elected and appointed 
members and with the MoH questioning the skill sets of the elected members to actively manage 
and drive performance improvements (Birchfield & Mueller, 2010), this research focused on the 
supervisory and monitoring aspects of board activity. While the business studied by Schwart-Ziv and 
Weisbach were not in healthcare, they share with New Zealand’s DHBs the fact that the Board 
members do not have a direct financial incentive tied to the organisations’ returns in the manner 
often employed by corporate organisations. The Israeli Boards that were reviewed were all 
government appointed, compared to the DHB Boards that consist of a mixture of elected and 
government appointed members. It is worth noting that in the Israeli companies it was the older and 
more experienced members who were more active in their management and governance duties. 
With the CDHB, the older and more experienced members tend to be those appointed by the 
Ministry of Health rather than the elected members that represent the local population.  
Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013, p. 363) said, “The results suggest that most of the time Boards 
play a supervisory role.” That 97.5% of the time they will agree with the wishes and directions of a 
Chief Executive Office, and only 1% of the time are they offered more than one option to discuss. 
Leblanc and Gillies (2010) suggested that in the corporate world of business, while a supervisory role 
may seem to result in acceptance of all ideas put forward by management, Board meetings should 
involve a certain amount of disagreement to encourage critical thinking. But by the time a vote is 
taken, the Board should have reached a consensus. Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013, p. 362) took 
this one step further by stating:    
A board in which matters are routinely approved without discussion is 
thought not to be providing much value to the firm.  
A former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Voluntary Hospitals of America, an organisation of over 
800 hospitals, summarised the basic role of a healthcare board in the following manner: 
Boards have 3 primary roles: to establish policies, to make significant and 
strategic decisions, and to oversee the organization's activity (Arnwine, 
2002, p. 19). 
Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013, p. 363) state: “Our knowledge of Boards of directors is 
substantially limited by the private way which they usually operate.” This much is also true for the 
DHBs, as there are portions of Health Board meetings that exclude the general public and meetings 
extend over lunchtimes, when Board members are able to discuss business without the need for 
these discussions to be recorded. 
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3.2.2 Boards or Management 
Boards of hospitals were created along philanthropic lines when hospitals were introduced to New 
Zealand in the late 1800s and the early 1900s. Since then, healthcare management, costs and 
delivery have changed dramatically. In many counties, there is often a central organization, 
frequently government run, where national health policies are created, as is the case with the 
Ministry of Health in New Zealand. As a result of this centralised national model, regional healthcare 
Boards are now left to monitor the local management team’s performance. Alexander and Lee 
(2006) found that hospitals in the USA governed by Boards created along the lines of a corporate 
governance model were more efficient than those who were setup in the philanthropic model.  
The following table has been put forward by Alexander and Lee (2006, p. 737) and “describes the 
attributes characterizing and differentiating these models.” 
Table 5 - Philanthropic and Corporate Models of Hospital Governing Boards 
Philanthropic Model Corporate Model 
Large board size Small board size 
Wide range of perspectives and backgrounds Narrow, more focused 
perspectives/backgrounds 
Small number of inside directors Large number of inside directors 
Little management participation on board Active management participation on board 
No formal management accountability to board Direct management accountability to board 
No limit to consecutive terms for board 
members 
Limit to consecutive terms for board members 
No compensation for board service Compensation provided for board service 
Emphasis on asset preservation Emphasis on strategic activity 
 
Alexander and Lee (2006, p. 737) went on to explain the two models in the following manner: 
The philanthropic model stresses community participation, due process, 
and stewardship, whereas the corporate model stresses strategy 
development, risk taking, and competitive positioning.  
Findings from the NHS in England noted that “board agendas and management meetings have 
become dominated by financial issues and activity targets” (Scally & Donaldson, 1998, p. 61). As 
many of the New Zealand DHB Boards are made up of locally elected people with little or no medical 
knowledge, poor financial management skills, a lack of experience in healthcare planning and 
decision making it may be of little surprise that Boards in New Zealand may lack the capacity to 
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“drive innovation, monitor and question the performance of providers, and act as a sounding board 
for the chief executive and other full time members” (Laugesen & Gauld, 2012, p. 150). This very 
issue is also highlighted in Section 3.2.5. where the same questions are raised by the MoH. With the 
lack of skills to act in a more managerial manner the Board’s only option is to act in a philanthropic-
style that may be a remnant of what was seen as a local system where locally elected people were 
able to influence the direction of local services. Frankish and Green (1994) argued that the general 
public of the USA demand greater responsiveness to the local communities from healthcare 
professionals and the central policy makers. Yet a reduction in the localisation of healthcare delivery 
and a move towards semi-centralisation or greater regionalisation is gaining greater support as both 
a theoretically-sound and pragmatically-based approach to modern healthcare system reforms 
(Frankish, Kwan, Ratner, Wharf Higgins, & Larsen, 2002). Regional healthcare management teams 
are commonly regarded as typifying the model best able to lead to better decisions and a more 
effective, efficient healthcare system, but there is little empirical evidence that citizen participation 
is needed (Mitton, Smith, Peacock, Evoy, & Abelson, 2009) and as such the requirement for the 
Board in its present format within New Zealand may have outlived its original purpose.  
 
3.2.3 Elected or Appointed  
If the goal of decentralisation was to get community input for the overall management and running 
of the New Zealand health system by having a community led Board, then the overall statistics for 
voter turnout do not seem to support the community involvement model. Figures since the 
introduction of decentralisation document a drop in the numbers of voters participating in the local 
body election process3, from an average of 47% in 2001 to 42% in 2013 (“Local Authority Election 
Statistics, ” 2013). New Zealanders' participation in local body elections compares well to the United 
Kingdom who operate a similar national healthcare system, where the average turn out dropped 
from 36% in 2008 to just over 31% in 2012 (Rogers & Burn-Murdoch, 2012). These figures pale in 
comparison to those in Sweden where over 80% of the population voted in local body elections in 
2002 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2002). When looking at local elections around the world, it 
becomes apparent that many counties struggle to get involvement from the public during local body 
election process (Milner & Ladner, 2006). Figure 5 is taken from the Local Authority Election 
Statistics covering the period from 1989 to 2013 and clearly shows the trend for local election voter 
                                                          
3 Elections of local authority members, including DHBs are held once every three years. The next elections will be held in 
2016 for city and district councils, regional councils and DHBs. In some parts of New Zealand elections will also be held for 
local and community boards, licensing trusts and some other organisations. All elections are currently held by postal voting 
(“Local Elections,” 2016). 
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turnout has declined over the 24-year period. By 2013 the turn out for CDHB elections had dropped 
to a recoded low of 42% and of the votes that were cast, over 20% of the returned voting papers 
were rejected as invalid (Carville, 2013).    
 
Figure 5 - Trend for Local Authority Voter Turnout 1989 to 2013 (“Local Authority Election Statistics,“ 
2013) 
With fewer people voting for their health Board members, questions are being asked by 
governments if elected Board members fully represent the local population (Baggott, 2005; 
Birchfield & Mueller, 2010). As the election process is often seen as cumbersome, and as the returns 
for Board members are often seen as modest compared to industry, many capable people are 
disinclined to present as candidates (Lewis et al., 2001). One of the many arguments put forward to 
keep elected membership is to gain the acceptance of the local residents. But with greater 
centralisation of the healthcare system, it is becoming harder to identify how local representation 
can be achieved. To support the idea of replacing elected board members, a study in Canada found 
that a higher proportion of appointed members perceived they had greater community respect and 
support compared to elected members (Lewis et al., 2001). With a continual decline in voter turnout 
for local body elections coupled with the lack of required skills sets within those members standing 
in the election process, a move to a fully appointed board may be held in greater esteem by the 
people they are set to represent here in New Zealand.  
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The elected members of a DHB Board are representative of the public and as such they are expected 
to attend all Board meetings and champion public health-related initiatives. If the board members 
are not achieving those goals, are not attending board meetings, then it may be fair for the public to 
ask just what their representatives are doing on their behalf. Holding the position of an elected 
member of the board for the local DHB brings with it a financial reward. This money may be viewed 
as compensation for the time and effort to attend meetings, to read and understand many of the 
reports presented at those meetings as well as being available to the electorate should they be 
approached. The following editorial from The Press on 19th November 2012, highlights that this may 
not be the case, and lists just who from the Board makeup in 2012 attended the 11 board meetings 
per year and who do not.  
Aaron Keown …  who received the most votes during the 2010 election has 
attended only one full meeting this year … Aaron Keown is not the only 
CDHB member to miss meetings since the 2010 election. Appointed 
member Susan Wallace has been absent seven times. Elected member 
Anna Crighton has been absent six times. Four meetings have been missed 
by appointed member Elizabeth Cunningham, appointed chairman Bruce 
Matheson, and elected members Chris Mene, Olive Webb and Wendy 
Gilchrist. Elected member David Morrell has been absent three times. 
Appointed deputy chairman Peter Ballantyne has been absent twice. 
Elected member Andrew Dickerson is the only Board member to have 
attended every meeting since the 2010 elections (Mathewson, 2012). 
 
3.2.4 Centralised or Decentralised 
The reallocation of authority away from the centralised state has stimulated many discussions on 
the issue of centralisation/decentralisation. Though many agree that governance should be multi-
layered, there is no general consensus on how this can be achieved (Liesbet & Gary, 2003). The 
centralised system produces a one size fits all model, and within healthcare this is often seen as no 
longer reflecting local needs (Sah & Stiglitz, 1991). With centralisation comes a greater ability to 
create wider ranging positive benefits via the decisions of highly capable managers, but highly 
incapable managers are able to create greater deleterious effects (Sah & Stiglitz, 1991).      
The ongoing question of greater centralised decision making versus a greater delegation to 
decentralised units has been discussed in many management literature papers (Byrkjeflot & Neby, 
2008; Kuhlmann & Saks, 2008; Mitchell & Bossert, 2010; Zabojnik, 2002). The main focus of these 
discussions has often revolved around two points:  
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1. Decentralisation can lead to a better understanding of information as it becomes distributed 
throughout all levels of an organisation (Byrkjeflot & Neby, 2008).  
2. The perceived loss of control by a central agent (Zabojnik, 2002).  
In many countries, decentralisation now seems to be the preferred management strategy for 
healthcare organisations (Magnussen, Hagen, & Kaarboe, 2007). This means devolution away from 
the central government healthcare department to regional, area, or DHBs (NZ) and Local Health 
Trusts (UK) (Bardhan, 2002; Rico & Léon, 2005). Yet decentralisation seems to be an unfinished and 
ongoing process where there is still a fine balance between central governance and greater self-rule 
(Rico & Léon, 2005).  
In many of the countries running a national Healthcare system, the UK, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, decentralisation of financial and political power is viewed as a method to improve the 
outcomes of regional and local healthcare issues. A study has been run in various OECD countries 
with the results showing that many different financial and political models are being used.  With this 
information there is no solid conclusion on which system is clearly better than any other (Rico & 
Léon, 2005).   
Since the Second World War, decentralisation has been one of the main thrusts of healthcare policy 
world-wide, though New Zealand went through a period between 1991 and 2000 of greater 
centralisation. With the new century, this policy of decentralisation seems to have taken a subtle 
turn (Laugesen & Gauld, 2012). Because of the increasing costs of modern medicine and the 
complexity of treatment, locally administered healthcare plans are becoming inefficient and result in 
unacceptable and costly duplication (Saltman, 2008). The advances in technical medicinal treatments 
and the introduction of the electronic health record have made it more feasible to monitor and in 
some cases plan for the delivery of healthcare at a central level (Saltman, 2008).  
However, there is still a need for the specialized district sites to share the localised medical 
knowledge (proximal knowledge) (Trinder & Reynolds, 2000). For this local knowledge to be relevant 
to a larger district or national environment, proximal knowledge must be de-contextualised, the core 
elements identified, transferred to another care environment, and re-contextualised in the new care 
setting (Clarke & Procter, 1999). Importantly for a district healthcare system, proximal knowledge is 
more likely to be sensitive to the demands of the individual, yet it is this very sensitivity that is key to 
individual patient care that could be lost with the growth of a centralised healthcare model. 
Clinicians may put a greater emphasis on tacit knowledge when organising healthcare for a region 
(Meijboom, de Haan, & Verheyen, 2004), sharing this knowledge within the hospital, and at the 
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same time being expected to stay on top of approximately 10,000 different diseases and syndromes, 
3000 medications, 2000 laboratory tests, and many of the 400,000 plus articles added each year to 
the biomedical literature (Nicolini, Powell, Conville, & Martinez‐Solano, 2008), clinicians can easily 
be overwhelmed.   
With all this in mind, I return to the earlier question; centralisation or decentralisation for healthcare 
governance? This research has found that there is no solid conclusion on which system is clearly 
better than the other (Byrkjeflot & Neby, 2008; Ciani, Tarricone, & Torbica, 2012; Rico & Léon, 2005)  
 
3.2.5 Public Participation 
Does public participation improve and enhance the legitimacy and quality of decisions made by 
governments, health Boards and public bodies? According to  Barnes et al. (2003, p. 379)  
Enhanced public participation is viewed as capable of improving the 
quality and legitimacy of decisions in government, health services, local 
government and other public bodies, as well as having the potential to 
address the ‘democratic deficit’ and building community capacity and 
social capital.  
The involvent of the public may be viewed as a way of manipulation rather than empowerment, 
when governments fail to recognise the different public perspectives, abilities, and motivational 
factors. Likewise, if little thought has been applied to the overall function of the citizen groups, then 
the selection criterion often fails to take into account relevant skills, competences, and the ability to 
truly represent the relevent constituencies. These may actually result in the exculsion of certain 
groups of the community (Barnes et al., 2003). 
Following on from the idea of public participation within the local healthcare system, there has been 
growth in public forums, community action groups and citizen juries (Barnes et al., 2003; Lowndes, 
Pratchett, & Stoker, 2001). Deliberative forums are intended to be inclusive, often having a goal of 
drawing excluded or marginalised groups into the policy or decision-making process (Barnes et al., 
2003; Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). This idea of drawing in all sectors of the community is questioned 
in the following statement:  
Does representation of disadvantaged groups require their actual presence 
within the forums and assemblies in which policy decisions are being 
made? (Barnes et al., 2003, p. 383). 
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 Instead of actively including marginalised groups, public forums may actively seek to exclude the 
very public they represent by classifiying them as “special interests” (Pfeffer, 1995) and that 
excluding them is often done for their own benefit (Littlewood, 2001; Prior, 1999). These very 
people, those from residential care, the physically frail, or those with mental health problems, are 
precisely the groups of people that should be included in community forums.  
From all the skills people could possess when taking up a position within public forums, there is a 
belief that “technical knowledge and skills were valued more highly than experiential knowledge” 
(Barnes et al., 2003, p. 393). From a New Zealand perspective, the MoH has noted concerns about 
the capacity of DHB Boards to govern effectively, particularly questioning whether the elected 
members of DHB Boards actually have the necessary skills to drive performance improvements, 
especially in the areas of financial performance (Birchfield & Mueller, 2010). 
While much literature has debated public engagement in healthcare 
decision-making, there is to-date no consensus on when public 
engagement should be sought (Mitton et al., 2009, p. 219),  
[W]hether the type of engagement is actually encouraging the people with 
the required skills sets (Laugesen & Gauld, 2012, p. 150). 
Finally, as put forward by El Ansari and Andersson (2011) there is to date no definitive study of 
public participation in a health system showing either the costs or benefits of local input.  
 
3.2.6 Reforming Public Involvement in the English National Health System 
Baggott (2005) looked at the ways the English National Health System (NHS) had endevoured to gain 
greater involvement of the general public with healthcare policy, healthcare planning, service 
provisioning and the benefits this had for the NHS. The study highlighted findings by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) and the Council of Europe, as well as research performed in Canada, 
Holland and Australia promoting greater involvement of the local population (Council of Europe, 
2000; Lister, 2001; World Health Organisation, 1994). The NHS has had various degrees of public 
involvment in health service since it was introduced in 1948. Initially, as directed by the Minister of 
Health, "lay members" were appointed to positions of authority in both regional and local healthcare 
sites. However, because these positions were appointed and not elected by the communities they 
claimed to serve they were viewed as lacking any legitimacy when acting as public representatives 
(Baggott, 2005, p. 535).  This was changed in the 1970s when the lay members’ positions were no 
longer centrally appointed, becoming elected by the local authorities. But this democraticisation of 
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the NHS governing bodies only lasted until the 1990s when the incoming Conservative Government 
ended the practice. The new patient forums were in the end described as ”a gothic divide and rule 
architecture of public and patient involvement”  (Hansard, 2003, as cited in Baggott, 2005, p. 547) 
that resulted in a lack of unification between the British public and the public healthcare providers. 
While cultural changes within healthcare may promote greater empowerment of citizen bodies or 
forums, greater accountability and a greater degree of transparency of the healthcare service may 
result in far greater benefits (Gillam & Brooks, 2001; Jewkes & Murcott, 1998; Rowe & Shepherd, 
2002). 
 
3.2.7 Complexities in Healthcare Management  
Since the early 1980s there have been numerous studies regarding both the differences and 
similarities between healthcare organisations in the public and private sector (Anderson, 2012; 
Fottler, 1981; Lachman, 1985; Perry & Babitsky, 1986; Perry & Rainey, 1988; Rainey, 1979; Solomon, 
1986; Whorton & Worthley, 1981). Whorton and Worthley (1981, p. 357) went on to write:  
Management in the public sector presents a number of unique challenges 
stemming from the paradoxical nature of the public administration 
environment…the public manager may indeed face a more complicated 
challenge than its counterparts within the private sector… inadequate 
understanding of the culture of public administration is a key obstacle to 
managerial improvement in government.  
Healthcare management is recognised as a specialist area of learning and as such many universities 
offer studies, ranging from diplomas, to Master's degrees in healthcare management, ethics, 
communications and leadership (Cornell Institute of Business & Technology, 2015; Harvard School of 
Public Health, 2014). Rather than a planned process, management and provisioning of the 
healthcare sector may be viewed as a continual negotiation between a number of parties: 
Government, voluntary and community organisations, and the private sector. With this model, the 
key task of government becomes the management of these complex networks of public service 
provisions (Cerny, 1997; Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997; McLaughlin, Osborne, & Ewan Ferlie, 
2002). This view of healthcare management may have come about because the image today is one 
where the system should provide for the individual needs of the members of the public while at the 
same time the public are increasingly demanding a greater say in the design and delivery of what 
they see as their service and in addition, they expect far greater choice (McLaughlin et al., 2002).  
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In comparison, it was the private sector organisational model that was used by New Zealand's  
National Government in 1993 when setting up governance for PHARMAC, an organization that has 
been credited by the British Medical Journal (BMJ) as ”the key reason for New Zealand’s low 
pharmaceutical prices” (Cumming, Mays, & Daubé, 2010, p. 2441).  
PHARMAC was setup in 1993 as a response to the spiralling cost of medicines within the New 
Zealand healthcare system.  
During the 1980s medicines prices were increasing at a faster rate than 
other healthcare spending, and were one of the fastest growing items of 
Government expenditure. Growth of more than 20% in some years meant 
medicine prices were threatening to crowd out other healthcare funding 
(PHARMAC, 2012). 
The objective of PHARMAC was to introduce “price competition” amongst the pharmaceutical 
industry to gain better value for medicine spending within the New Zealand healthcare system. 
PHARMAC introduced the model referred to as “reference pricing” where drugs offering the same 
benefits were subsidized in place of the higher priced internationally branded medicines. But this is 
not the only area of PHARMAC’S responsibilities. They also have a strong interest in the use of the 
medicines within the healthcare system, with specific emphasis on the underuse, overuse and 
misuse of medicines. The first campaign run by PHARMAC was in 1998 and was aimed at the 
inappropriate prescribing of antibiotics for winter colds and flu (PHARMAC, 2012).   
 
3.2.8 Is Competition Healthy Within Healthcare Provisioning? 
The term “neoliberalism” within healthcare is made up of two notions, neo, meaning new and liberal 
meaning free from government intervention, or rather a belief in the efficiency of the free market. 
This system of healthcare is often viewed as the model in place within the USA. This is in contrast to 
the “socialised” healthcare model in place in New Zealand, the UK, Scandinavia and Canada where 
the state, or central government, regulates healthcare subsidized from taxation.   
Unlike agriculture or the manufacturing industry, public healthcare organisations are not usually 
driven by the need to operate at a profit (Christensen, Lægreid, Roness, & Røvik, 2007; Haynes, 
1980). Standard market theory, when applied to a National Healthcare System that is overseen and 
regulated by a central governing body, may produce ambiguous predictions when looking at the 
effects of competition (Mays, 2011). This is complicated by the fact that patients are dependent on 
the decisions of doctors about what is needed, and management direction that may be driven by a 
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central governmental organisation, the MoH, setting out directives and policy that dictates whether 
they are able to access further care. If the failings of private contracting in the US are 
underappreciated, so too is a major success story of the Veterans Health Administration (VA) 
system.  
This network of hospitals and clinics owned and operated by the US 
Government was long derided as a US example of failed Soviet-style central 
planning. It has recently emerged as a widely recognised leader in quality 
improvement and information technology. At present, the VA offers more 
equitable care, of higher quality, at comparable or lower cost than private 
sector alternatives (Woolhandler & Himmelstein, 2007, p. 1127).  
Yet the shift from a public service to a business model has, on average, raised costs partly by 
stimulating the growth of bureaucracy.  
The proportion of health funds devoted to administration in the US has 
risen 50% in the past 30 years and stands at 31% of total health spending, 
nearly twice the proportion in Canada… Meanwhile, administration has 
been transmogrified from the servant of medicine to its master, from a 
handful of support staff dedicated to facilitating patient care to a vast army 
preoccupied with profitability (Woolhandler & Himmelstein, 2007, p. 
1127).  
This transformation has had an impact in other nations as well. The advent of internal markets 
sharply increased administrative costs in the UK (Health Policy Network of the NHS Consultants' 
Association, 1995) and within New Zealand during the centralisation period of 1991 to 2000 (Coney, 
1996). Within Canada, a country that runs a national Healthcare system providing publicly funded 
healthcare to all Canadian citizens, the overheads of Canadian private insurers in 1999 were ten 
times higher than those of public provincial health insurance programmes. Comparing the 
administration cost of the Canadian public system to the USA, the USA spent about $450 per capita 
on health care administration, compared to Canada who spent about $150 per capita (Woolhandler, 
Campbell, & Himmelstein, 2003). In Australia during the period 1998 to 1999, tax subsidies for 
private insurance directed money through private firms, with overheads averaging 12% versus 3.5% 
in the public programme (Wilcox, 2001). Duckett and Jackson (2000) stated that private hospitals in 
Australia are about 10% costlier than public ones. As Germany's insurance plans adopted an 
increasingly business-like mode of operation, administrative costs soared 63.3% between 1992 and 
2003; meanwhile doctors complained about an avalanche of paperwork (Hyde, 2006).  
Health systems in every nation need continuous innovation and improvement to keep ahead of the 
ever-increasing cost of the delivery of healthcare and medications. However, “remedies imported 
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from commerce consistently yield inferior care at inflated prices” (S. Woolhandler & D. Himmelstein, 
2007, p. 1139). S. Woolhandler and D. Himmelstein (2007, p. 1129) went one step further by stating 
that “poor performance of US health care is directly attributable to reliance on market 
mechanisms.”  
 
3.3 Healthcare Structure in New Zealand 
Public healthcare organisations are fundamentally different from their counterparts in the private 
sector (Regidor et al., 2008). Within New Zealand the system is multifunctional while also being 
accountable to both political and publicly elected leadership. The DHB system requires an emphasis 
on openness, transparency, impartiality and predictability while patients within the system expect 
equal treatment regardless of race, age or gender.  
Healthcare and disability services in New Zealand are delivered by a 
complex network of organisations and people. Each has their role in 
working with others across the system to achieve better health for New 
Zealanders (Ministry of Health, 2014a).  
At the heart of the New Zealand healthcare system are the 20 District Health Boards, responsible for 
delivering all aspect of healthcare for their region. Though each DHB is an entity in its own right, 
accountable to the people of its region via a governing Board of directors, the first line of reporting 
and accountability is directly to the Ministry of Health and central government. The DHBs are also 
responsible for the planning and funding of the various primary healthcare services, including GPs, 
midwives, disability services and community and voluntary providers, though some community and 
primary services receive direct funding from the MoH. Regardless of how funding is provided, the 
majority of the reporting and monitoring for primary services is managed via the regional DHB.  
The Ministry of Health allocates more than three-quarters of the public 
funds it manages through Vote Health to DHBs, who use this funding to 
plan, purchase and provide health services, including public hospitals and 
the majority of public health services, within their areas (Ministry of 
Health, 2015). 
Figure 6 gives a graphical representation of the funding split by the MoH with regards to nationally 
sponsored services, the DHBs and the Ministry.  
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Major restructuring of the governance and management of healthcare during the 1990s had little 
impact on overall costs or efficiency (Bloom & Guest, 2001). Within any healthcare system, regional 
or central, a general increase in healthcare spending on a national level is not uniformly associated 
with improved health amongst all regions (Clancy & Cronin, 2005). 
Many of the policy changes for healthcare over recent years have come about because of the 
financial pressures placed on hospitals and DHBs as successive governments strive to restrict the 
healthcare budget. This has been highlighted recently with the reported cuts to the mental health 
budget within the CDHB even though the call on mental healthcare workers has increased in the 
Canterbury district since the earthquakes in 2010-2011 (Stewart, 2016).  
As the DHBs first line of reporting is now directly to the central government and not to the local 
public, the need for a locally elected Board may be irrelevant, and its removal may save the health 
system both time and money. If there is justified need for some form of public control over the 
healthcare system, should this be elected by the local population, or appointed by central 
government? Conversely, is there a need for a district governance system if the reporting model 
dictates the first level of accountability to central government? Central reporting may be better 
served with a central governance system.  
 
3.3.1 District Healthcare Structure  
 
The current DHB structure presents a system with large amounts of duplication that could be 
reduced or removed with the introduction of greater centralisation.  
DHBs have not worked collaboratively to develop and plan services, and 
localised control has worked against the development of a health care 
‘system’, and instead facilitated the creation of multiple parallel local 
systems with their own executive management teams, budgets and 
planning processes, and configurations for service delivery (Laugesen & 
Gauld, 2012, p. 170)   
With the increasing cost of specialised medical departments and shortage of qualified staff, many of 
the smaller DHBs are having to rely on larger DHBs to provide the costlier treatments. The Burns and 
Spinal Injury Units situated at the Burwood hospital in Christchurch are two examples of locally 
provided national treatment centres. These units are the primary centres of specialised care not only 
for the South Island, in the case of the Burns Unit, for the entire country. This move to provide 
centres of excellence for medicine is resulting in greater centralised healthcare, yet this is not 


45 
 
Under the divisional structure utilized within the New Zealand healthcare model, Clinical Directors 
occupy an ambiguous position in the management hierarchy. Clinical Directors are usually SMOs 
operating in both a clinical and managerial role. Yet their managerial role seems to lack a clear and 
acknowledged line of responsibility to senior hospital management.  
For many departments within the DHB, at the bottom of the ladder is the trainee intern who works 
alongside qualified clinicians and gains the experience required to complete their medical study. 
Newly qualified doctors within a department are usually listed as House Officers and will have to 
pass through many years of further study and exams to reach the position of Registrar, then again, 
more study and more exams before they specialise and gain recognition as a Senior Medical Officer 
(SMO). Within highly specialised departments, some of the SMOs may report to the MoH, as well as 
upwards through the existing hospital structure. The same SMOs may also report directly to the 
Chief Executive Officer of the DHB. With the specialty department, there may be a SMO assigned to 
the position of Clinical Director. This position varies from speciality to speciality, and because of the 
extra and varied workload this position is often only held for a number of years.  Not only is the 
Clinical Director a senior clinician, Thorne (1997, p. 205) went further by saying:   
Clinical directors embody the tensions and conflicts of different managerial 
and professional cultures, whilst attempting to reconcile the demands of 
purchasers with the views of disparate and difficult professional colleagues. 
It is not surprising that for any SMOs, being a Clinical Director is often viewed as a potential threat to 
their professional identity, autonomy, and collegiality for both the individual and the clinical 
speciality the director is representing (Thorne, 1997). Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, and Pettigrew 
(1996) suggested that clinicians may view this move towards management as a betrayal of their 
clinical profession. Fitzgerald and Dufour (1997) proposed that clinicians who took on this dual 
mantle were often viewed with a degree of suspicion by their colleagues and the position of Clinical 
Director has been described as “a sop to the clinicians, so they could feel that clinicians still had 
some say in the running of the place” (Doolin, 2001, p. 236). This may have been an attempt by 
senior hospital management to win clinicians over to managerial values and thinking. The idea of 
transferring the responsibility from management to clinicians was to engage the same people who 
delivered patient care in strategic management decisions for the day to day running of the clinical 
department (Thorne, 2000).  
The following quotes were taken from a letter to the editor of the Irish Journal of Medical Science, 
submitted in 2009 by Latif (2011, p. 299) and highlight reasons why clinicians are not always coming 
forward to take up the mantle of Clinician and Manager:  
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Most doctors are reluctant to participate in management due to lack of 
time, poor involvement in management by the managers, lack of 
understanding of management culture, and lack of opportunities to get 
training in management in spite of a strong inner desire to be involved 
which leaves them frustrated at times… Power without responsibility is 
dangerous, but responsibility without power is frustrating …[D]octors are 
not sure what role is expected from them, whether it should be, ‘doctors as 
managers’, ‘doctors in management’, or ‘doctors and management’. 
The following was quoted by Doolin (2001, p. 241) from a senior clinician regarding their 
management team: 
I object to someone who has trivial training and very little understanding of 
my field running my life. For example, MBAs, it’s an Outward-Bound course 
at university as far as I can see, for people who haven’t even had a previous 
degree.  
With these types of comments healthcare managers may be viewed as poorly qualified and 
management as nothing more than just common sense. As such, the role may be perceived as being 
one that is easily learnt and seen as below the level of a fully trained clinician (Ferlie et al., 1996).  
Smith (1955, p. 59) summed up one of the issues that may have prompted management to 
introduce the position of Clinical Director:    
There is almost no administrative routine established in hospitals which 
cannot be (and frequently is) abrogated or countermanded by a physician 
claiming medical emergency – or by any one acting for the physician and 
similarly claiming medical necessity.  
Smith also went on to point out the dual levels of authority that abounds with a hospital come close 
to those described by Max Weber, the German sociologist, philosopher and political economist. By 
creating the position of Clinical Director, it may help to reduce the dichotomy of values where 
management are focused on the budgetary values of a hospital, and clinicians are more attuned to 
the healthcare needs of the public, including those who cannot or will not contribute to their own 
care (Smith, 1955).    
 
3.4 Chapter Summary  
New Zealand has had public Boards involved in the governance and management of the healthcare 
system for the majority of the time that a healthcare system has existed. Because of the reporting 
structures, public Boards are accountable to the government, and not to the local residents of the 
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DHB region. In this manner, the public Board may be seen as a “rubber stamping” agent acting on 
behalf of a central management agency and only giving the impression that a regional, non-
centralised system exists. If accurate, Boards may have become nothing more than local 
representatives administering central government policy (Laugesen & Gauld, 2012, p. 141), and 
there may be a case to remove elected members from the Board altogether and move towards a 
fully elected Board. But by doing so it would remove the main area that is seen as involving the 
public within the public healthcare system. Looking back at the figures for public engagement within 
the DHB and local body elections, with the number of people actually voting for these local bodies 
falling, public engagement in its present format may not be receiving support from the public the 
healthcare system is trying to engage with.  Although the overall number of Boards has been 
reduced from 46 to 20, when compared to models in use overseas, the resident population for some 
of New Zealand’s smaller health Boards are seen as too small to have enough residents with the 
required skill sets to stand as Board members (Laugesen & Gauld, 2012, p. 11). As put forward by El 
Ansari and Andersson (2011) the lack of a definitive study of the benefits of local participation within 
healthcare again raises the question of whether elected or a fully appointed Board may benefit the 
DHB system.     
The complexity of the modern-day healthcare system may have introduced multiple lines of 
authority for senior clinical and medical members. Through these multiple lines or reporting the 
clinician has in the past and still may abrogated or countermanded many of the administrative 
routines in the name of clinical emergency or patient safety.  Finally, the following poem, “I used to 
be a doctor” (Cooke & Philpin, 2008, p. 101), may sum up some of the frustrations felt by those 
practicing medicine.   
I used to be a doctor  
now I am a Health Care Provider  
I used to practise medicine  
now I function under a managed care system  
I used to have patients  
now I have a consumer list  
I used to diagnose  
now I am approved for one consultation  
I used to treat  
now I wait for authorisation to provide care ....  
I used to have a successful people practice  
now I have a paper failure  
I used to spend time listening to my patients  
now I spend time justifying myself to the authorities  
I used to have feelings  
now I have an attitude  
Now I don’t know what I am    
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Chapter 4 
Methods 
4.1  Introduction  
This chapter discusses the methodological steps of defining the issue, determining the sample size, 
collecting the data, and analysing the data. An increasing number of researchers are using a mixed 
method approach for their research, a combination of quantitative and qualitative questioning. This 
approach is seen as offering both a logical and intuitive link between the two types of data, 
quantitative and qualitative (Bergman, 2008; Brannen, 2008; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2006), thus 
providing a richer and more informative mechanism for understanding. 
This research uses the mixed method approach, where both qualitative and quantitative questioning 
were incorporated into a structured interview. This was designed to gain a more holistic and 
comprehensive understanding of the impact the Canterbury District Health Board structure has on 
the efficiency and efficacy of clinical operations from a clinician’s perspective within the Christchurch 
hospital.  The use of this method allowed the collection of quantitative data which provided direct 
measures of physicians' opinions whilst also allowing them to express their individual views of the 
issues and challenges this project focussed upon.    
To enhance understanding of the comments in the literature review, it is necessary to understand 
what the board actually does.  With this in mind an analysis of the board meetings was 
conducted.  This had the added benefit of informing the survey creation and interpretation. 
 
4.2 CDHB Board Meeting Analysis 
One way of analysing what the CDHB Board do is to look back at Board meeting agendas and 
minutes to review what sort of issues or points were being brought before the board. If the Board 
are openly discussing the points put to them, whether the Board was able to provide any input, 
suggest any direction for issues or offer advice and guidance, or whether they were only being 
brought to the Board’s attention but needed no action. At the same time as looking at the direction 
and input of the Board to the point put forward, the research was able to review input from the 
clinical areas to the Board.  
49 
 
Data from 32 CDHB Board meetings were analysed and coded following standard content analysis 
methods (Krippendorff, 2012; Lieblich et al., 1998; Schwartz-Ziv & Weisbach, 2013). Of the 32 board 
meeting documents, 12 were taken from September 2009 to September 2010, representing a pre-
earthquake period. No meetings were held in January due to the Christmas and New Year holidays. 
The remaining 20 documents were from February 2012 to October 2013, representing a post-
earthquake period. The time period of 32 months was selected because this was the only Board 
Meeting data available. Information prior to September 2009 was no longer in the public domain.    
For each of the items listed within both the agenda and meeting minutes, the following areas were 
searched for and recorded:  
1. Number of Points Discussed: Within the meeting minutes how many of the areas or points 
set down generated general discussion between members of the Board and management.     
2. Options Offered: Were the Board presented with a range of options to discuss, and allowed 
to vote on which direction, or action, would best suit the CDHB?  
3. Motion Passed: After any ensuing discussion, was there a final motion to accept or reject the 
point(s)? 
4. RFI: (Request for Information) had there been any request for more information?      
 
4.3 Qualitative versus Quantitative Research  
Qualitative research endeavours to make sense of, or interpret, situational data in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Silverman, 2013). The use of qualitative 
data lends a certain amount of strength and richness to the research method, concentrating on the 
processes, while extrapolating meaning and understanding (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002). Many of 
the phenomena this project was designed to investigate required an understanding of how the 
respondents interpreted the managerial demands of their jobs. For this project, then, a qualitative 
approach enabled the interviewee to offer up vivid accounts of their experiences gained through 
working in their specific field of specialisation. This recognised that much of the data necessary for 
the study could not simply be reduced to numbers (Fitz-Gibbon, 2000), preserving the richness 
qualitative data can provide. Merriam (1988, p. 17) went on to explain that the act of quantifying 
textual qualitative data may lead to a loss of understanding when it comes to specific individual’s 
situations:   
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Qualitative research assumes that there are multiple realities – that the 
world is not an objective thing out there but a function of personal 
interaction and perception.  It is a highly subjective phenomenon in need 
of interpreting rather than measuring.  Beliefs rather than facts form the 
basis of perception.  Research is exploratory, inductive, and emphasises 
processes rather than ends.  
In comparison to qualitative data, quantitative data can and very often is very specific and thus lends 
itself to many forms of questionnaire research with its numerical questioning format (Babbie, 2006; 
Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2006). This approach is well-suited to a substantial portion of the current 
project, as data captured in a quantitative manner allows the use of graphical displays and tables as 
a form of reporting the results, which are often seen as a quick and easy way to absorb large 
quantities of data in a simple, informative, and effective manner.  
Thus, the method used in this research is a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative questions 
set out in an interview. By this method, the quantitative segments provide a framework which was 
then expanded upon by the interviewee by providing qualitative responses. This was seen as 
allowing the use of the best strengths of both methods, thus gaining the advantages provided by 
both techniques.       
A key feature of mixed methods research is its methodological pluralism or 
eclecticism, which frequently results in superior research (compared to 
monomethod research) (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 14) 
 
4.4 Content Analysis and Structured Interviews  
Utilizing the mixed method approach in the interview process allowed the Clinical staff to go further 
than just responding to direct questions with a numerical choice. By virtue of their extensive 
training, medical clinicians are ideally placed to think about and respond to questions that are 
relevant to the organisation and delivery of healthcare in New Zealand's publicly -funded system. 
The clinicians responded to the questions about healthcare management and elaborated on the 
relevant issues from their specialist area perspective.            
Common limitations of a structured interview are often bias-orientated. These include bias due to 
poor construction, bias in the response to the questions, inaccuracies in the way the interviewee 
recalls situational details and a social-desirability bias. Limitations also include the over-reporting of 
good behaviour or positively perceived situations while downplaying bad behaviour or negative 
situations (Babbie, 2006; Grimm, 2010). To mitigate these issues, great care was taken to construct 
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the questionnaire in such a way that the questions were able to be answered in both a direct 
(quantitative) and expanded, in-depth contextual (qualitative) manner. In this way, each of the 
specialist healthcare clinicians were able to more comprehensively respond to questions about each 
issue from a different perspective that could be later analysed.   
 
4.5 The Interview design 
The interviews explored how the clinicians at the CDHB were affected in their clinical operations by 
the managerial and bureaucratic structure of the healthcare system they work within. The project 
focusses on what the clinicians see as successes and failures of the present healthcare setup and 
how successes may be amplified while weaknesses can be mitigated. The interview was primarily 
derived from the recurring themes that emerged from the literature review and consists of six 
sections focusing on these inter-related themes. These six sections are further described below. 
Many of the questions were designed to be answered using a Likert scale response (strongly agree to 
strongly disagree). With the use of a voice recorder, the interviewee was encouraged to expand on 
their answers, giving a fuller descriptive explanation of their opinion, while also enabling them to 
expound both personal and professional beliefs.  
The use of qualitative interviewing techniques have allowed this research to further explore 
clinicians' personal and professional feelings and opinions regarding the structure of the Canterbury 
District Health Board and how this structure impacts their clinical operations (Bowling, 2014). 
Bauman and May (1990) referred to this as “defamiliarising”, which allows the researcher to look 
for a fresh perspective on what is familiar. By asking more searching questions, or in a simple format, 
constantly asking “why” forced the clinicians to look at what may have become accepted or taken 
for granted as the status quo. The act of peeling back what had become ingrained within the social 
fabric of the CDHB, its culture and management structure, allowed the interviewee to expose areas 
that may be not have initially been mentioned or highlighted, yet could impact the clinical efficiency 
and efficacy in both a positive and negative manner. Pope and Mays (2013, p. 4) went on to expand 
on this by saying:  
Rather than simply accepting the concepts and explanations used in 
everyday life, qualitative research asks fundamental and searching 
questions about the nature of social phenomena.  
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Section One:  The CDHB Board and the participant's relationship with it. Nine main questions made 
up this section, some of which have a combination of open-ended questions and rating scales. The 
initial question in this section asked if the clinician had perceived any synergy with the Board of the 
CDHB with regard to their position in the management structure, and if so how much benefit this 
afforded them in their office. The section goes on to explore the clinician's impression of population 
representation within the system, and if the board can be seen as a fair representation of the people 
of Canterbury. This was followed by an assessment of the manner in which the board are perceived 
to act, whether the policies, activities and guidance provided enhances the efficiency of the CDHB. 
They were then asked to provide a ranking of that performance from a clinical perspective. The final 
three questions concentrate on system governance and asked if this should be the responsibility of a 
board or by hired management, and if by a board, whether this should be composed of elected 
locals or appointed members. Finally, the clinicians were asked if the management function should 
be performed locally, centrally or by a mixture of both central and local groups. During the 
presentation of each question the interviewee was asked to both expand upon and explain why they 
were giving those answers. 
 Section Two:  The CDHB Management. Six questions made up the second section and cover the 
areas of perceived management effectiveness and its interactions with the clinicians. As in the first 
section, the second section has a mix of both open-ended questions and rating scale questions. The 
set scale questions were followed up by asking why the clinician had answered as they did and if 
improvements could be made, and if so, how. The questions in this section focussed on clinical 
involvement with the management of the CDHB. I began by asking if the clinicians meet with 
management and if so, how often and about what. Questions two and three asked about the 
effectiveness of management at the delivery of healthcare and of managing clinical operations. Both 
of these questions were answered by rating from 1, Not effective to 5, Very effective and were 
followed up by asking if they thought this could be changed, and if so how. Question four asked 
about the role of the clinician in healthcare management and whether they though they should play 
a greater part. Again, follow up questions, if yes why, if no, why not, allowed the clinician to expand 
on their reasons. Question five, “in your experience is management responsive to clinical concerns” 
was answered using a scale of 1 representing unresponsive, to 5, totally responsive. The final 
question asked if the clinician thought healthcare for Canterbury should be managed locally, 
centrally or by a mix of both. Again, this was followed by the supplementary question of why?      
Section Three:  The Ministry of Health (MoH). Five questions made up Section Three and as in the 
previous two sections, there was a mixture of both open-ended and scaled responses. Again, all 
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questions were followed with the same prompting as described above for greater detail, asking if 
they thought this could be changed and if so how without impacting greatly on the time participants 
required for treating their patients. The section concentrated on the MoH, how the policies created 
by the MoH impact on clinician’s decisions and if clinicians have enough or too little say on those 
decisions. The questions start by asking the interviewee the level of influence they have on 
healthcare policy created in Wellington and is answered by the scale rating of 1, no influence to 5, 
great influence. Question two asks if clinicians should have greater say on policy created by the MoH 
and if followed up with the supplementary question, why. Question three asks how much leeway the 
CDHB has implementing the MoH policy and here again the response was via the scale rating of 1 
being none, to 5 being great leeway. The final two questions were designed to measure the 
perceived impact of MoH policy on clinical decisions and ask if clinicians believe the MoH should 
have greater of less control over clinical priorities. As in all other sections, participants were 
encouraged to discuss their responses in greater detail. 
Section Four:  Public Engagement in the Healthcare system. There are only two questions making 
up Section Four. The first is a direct question asking if the public should have any influence over the 
CDHB, and if so, how this could be achieved. The second question links back to the Board asking if 
the board chamber is the best place for a public debate on healthcare.  As in the previous sections, 
both of these questions were followed up by asking the interviewee why they answered as they did 
and if they thought these procedures could be changed, how this could be achieved.     
Section Five:  Participant's experience of different Health models. Here again this section consists 
of only two questions but with a potential for five further explanatory questions. These centre 
around the clinician’s experience of working in other healthcare systems outside New Zealand and 
how this compares to the present DHB structure. The first of the questions asks if the clinician has 
worked solely in New Zealand. If they answer ”Yes”, then the next three supplementary questions 
are skipped over. For interviewees answering ”No”, the questions explore which other countries 
they have worked in and the nature of their work environment in those locations. There was a 
question asking which of the healthcare systems they have worked in better suited them, and finally 
how the New Zealand healthcare model compares with those from overseas. Here again, these 
questions were followed up by asking why they answered as they did and how they felt the 
situations helped or hindered them in their clinical operations. The last question in Section Five 
asked how effective the CDHB model is at delivering optimal healthcare for Christchurch. This final 
question was answered in a scaled response between 1 and 5, where 1 equals “ineffective” and 5 
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equals “cured all the world's ills”. Again, this was followed up asking if they thought this should be 
changed, how this could be done.   
Section Six:  Participants’ Demographics. The final section consists of five questions asking the age 
of the interviewee, to which ethnic group they identify with, and the gender of the interviewee. It 
also asks which country they first qualified as a doctor, and how long they have been working within 
the CDHB.   
 
4.6 Interviewee Selection and Size of the Group    
This study limited the project to only one of the 20 health Boards in New Zealand, concentrating on 
the Christchurch city campus. The number of clinicians who were asked to participate, was restricted 
to 37. This is in keeping with Adler and Adler (1987), who advised between that 12 and 60 people 
should be used in a survey, where Ragin and Backer (1992) recommended between 20 and 50 
people (Adler & Adler, 1987; Ragin & Becker, 1992). In this case, the 37-senior clinician’s that were 
selected were Clinical Directors (CDs), Senior Medical Officers (SMOs) and Academic Heads of 
Departments (AHoDs) covering all medical and surgical areas within the Christchurch hospital and 
thus constituted what is arguably a census rather than a sample. This group is thus viewed as being 
in a position to knowledgably respond to the questions in a way that represents the broadest range 
of CDs, SMOs, and HoDs. They are the main group of clinicians that would have a dual line of 
authority issue due to their responsibility statuses of both management and clinicians in the 
structure provided by New Zealand’s healthcare system. Clinical Directors embody the tensions and 
conflicts of the various managerial levels within the hospital setting, whilst attempting to placate 
and reconcile the demands of disparate and difficult professional colleagues (Thorne, 1997). 
This multiplicity of roles provides the basis for the tensions this project was designed to observe and 
measure. The present structure that results in clinicians taking up positions within the management 
hierarchy while also holding the clinical role of administering healthcare to patients has been 
defined in the following manner by Doolin (2001, p. 249): 
The clinical leadership strategy can be interpreted as an attempt to 
influence clinical behaviour through cultural change within the medical 
profession by diluting or undermining professional values and norms with 
managerial ones. 
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Trying to gain a larger sample size would prove to be prohibitively difficult, consuming excessive 
time, and would need to include clinicians that are not Clinical Directors nor Academic heads of 
Department, nor as a consequence having much of the managerial responsibilities that are of 
interest to this study. As a result, they may not be able to comment authoritatively in all areas of the 
schedule and so were not sought for participation. 
 
4.7 Development of the Interview  
An interview can be either unstructured, running more along the lines of a general conversation 
(Burgess, 1982; Corbin & Morse, 2003) or in a structured manner where a conversation may still be 
had, but is guided in a purposeful manner to gain detailed information around specific topics 
(Babbie, 2006; Sternberg, Lamb, Esplin, Orbach, & Hershkowitz, 2002). An interview schedule was 
created using questions derived from the literature relevant to CDHB clinical operations. Because of 
the audience and the nature of the questions put forward by this research, a structured interview 
method was considered a better approach for this exploratory project (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Fox & 
Spector, 2000). This use of a mixed method allowed both qualitative and quantitative questions to 
be scattered though out the questionnaire resulting in greater detail (Dörnyei, 2007). This approach 
allowed the interviewee the opportunity to provide direct numerical answers to specific topics, 
while also offering the interviewee a forum for further expanding on the topics covered, letting both 
personal feelings and emotional attitudes to be presented. The use of direct interviews affords the 
interviewer some degree of empathy towards the interviewee, who may in turn become more open, 
revealing their unguarded thoughts.  
The interview has the potential to be an extremely sensitive device for the 
acquisition of valid and reliable data.  Most people are more willing to talk 
and verbally react than write responses to questions (Adams & 
Schvaneveldt, 1985, p. 214).   
Adams and Schvaneveldt (1985) went one step further, proposing that an interview may be more 
sensitive than a questionnaire when coping with issues of validity. As the basic structure of the 
research had concentrated on the five major factors impacting clinical operation, it seemed fitting to 
structure the questionnaire in the same manner. These five factors were shown in Figure 1, Chapter 
1 Section 5, Research Objectives and Questions, and were the MoH, Management, Clinicians, the 
Public and the Board. These five factors of influence were then reviewed against the thesis 
questions, repeated below:    
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 Should the healthcare system embrace greater centralisation or greater regionalisation? 
 Should the healthcare system be administered by a board or by management?  
 Should the administrative governance team be elected or appointed?  
 What degree of public participation should there be within the public healthcare system?    
      
Using each of the five factors, this researcher was able to create a set of questions that related to 
the thesis questions. Because of the nature of the thesis, great care had to be taken with the 
wording of many of the questionnaire questions, the grouping of the questions in each of the five 
factors, and checks made to make certain both ethical and patient confidentiality laws in place 
within the New Zealand healthcare environment were not compromised (Hair, Wolfinbarger, 
Money, Samouel, & Page, 2015; Ruane, 2004). The questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.   
 
4.8 Questionnaire Development and Pre-trial  
Once the questionnaire was in a format where it could be presented to the clinicians, a trial was run 
with one of the specialist healthcare groups situated on the Christchurch campus. Five Senior 
Medical Officers, including the Clinical Director and academic head of department, plus the Charge 
Nurse Manager, were asked to provide feedback on the device. Because the trial group was 
relatively small, and all the interviewees were situated in the same department, it was decided that 
the best way to get everyone to participate would be to approach each person privately rather than 
sending out a letter requesting participation. Doing this also had the advantage of answering the 
numerous questions that were raised while also explaining in more detail why and what the thesis 
was about. Some of the responses to this initial round of interviews had the added benefit of helping 
to shed more light on the ”Bad Old Days” of the 1990’s, covered in Section 2.4.   
Once all the participation forms for the trial participants were signed, randomly generated, unique 
four digit numbers were assigned to each questionnaire using an online random number generation 
tool (Urbaniak & Plous, 2013). A cross-reference sheet linking the participant to each form's unique 
number was kept until the trial was completed. Upon completion of the trial, the cross-reference 
sheet was destroyed, thus guaranteeing confidentiality.  
The trial group were interviewed in early February 2015. The use of the trial group enabled the 
interview process to be fine-tuned. Results of this trial exercise were used to make minor changes to 
the questionnaire as well as to the delivery method. For example, within the trial-run the full 
questionnaire sheet was presented to the interviewee to read while each question was read out by 
the interviewer. The result of this process was that the interviewees tended to jump ahead and 
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answer more than one question at a time (Appelbaum, Marchionni, & Fernandez, 2008; Junco & 
Cotten, 2012; Wood et al., 2012). In an attempt to inhibit this sort of multitasking, and to re-
establish their full concentration on the question posed, the questionnaire sheet was replaced with 
individual question prompt cards. These can be found in Appendix F.  
The direct approach to the clinicians resulted in a 100% uptake for the trial group, and after many 
recommendations from the participants in the trial group, it was decided that continuing with this 
direct approach to all the clinicians targeted for inclusion in the sample would have a better chance 
of gaining full participation for the main project. Senior Medical Offices have to deal with a large 
volume of paperwork in their daily routines, and those SMOs that participated in the trial sessions 
believed that a letter of participation would not be the best way to get a prompt reply. In many 
cases, they suggested, it might result in no reply at all. Each potential subject was therefore 
approached individually and in person, asked to participate, and upon agreement, was asked to read 
and agree to participation via their signature on a release form.  
Each of the interviews were recorded enabling transcription and later analysis. The initial interview 
using the full sheet for the interviewee lasted on average 30 minutes. Once the move to the 
laminated prompt cards was introduced, times for the interview increased to just over 52 minutes. 
In retrospect, as the trial group was a more isolated department within the Christchurch campus, it 
was no surprise to find that the interaction between the Board and the group was minimal.  
 
4.9 The Interview  
The interview protocol was adjusted in light of the trial run described above. After individually 
approaching each of the clinicians listed as candidate for the questionnaire, a work schedule was 
drafted allowing 90 minutes for each interview giving enough time to settle and answer any question 
the clinician may have regarding the study before commencing the interview. The ideal was to 
interview two clinicians a day, one in the morning after the clinical groups had completed patient 
ward rounds, with the second interview later in the afternoon. Due to the busy nature of clinicians' 
workloads, this was not always possible. Some days there were no interviews able to be scheduled 
and completed.  
Each of the clinicians who agreed to participate in the research were interviewed in the same 
manner by the same interviewer, thus minimising the potential for interview bias. The interviews 
were conducted in the clinician’s private chambers, allowing them to relax in their own semi-private 
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surroundings. Having the interview held in an area where the clinician felt relaxed and more at ease 
was seen as a way to encourage them to expand on their answers by recalling experiences and in an 
unperturbed and confidential fashion. It also provided a degree of privacy where a meeting in the 
canteen or the clinicians' lounge may have resulted in an endless stream of interruptions from 
colleagues and junior clinicians regarding patient care. Finally, as the hospital is still recovering from 
earthquake damage, there is a shortage of usable meeting rooms.  
The interviews were not totally free from interruptions, however. There were times where the 
clinician was interrupted by telephone calls from other clinicians around the hospital. This was 
unfortunate but because of the nature of the position held by the interviewees, being academic 
heads of department or clinical director for a specialist area, interruptions are a vital and potentially 
lifesaving part of their role. For the clinician being interviewed, this was seen as nothing out of the 
ordinary, and once the interruption was over, they were again able to give their full concentration to 
the questionnaire.         
The same format for interviewee confidentiality described above was used for the main 
questionnaire administration. Once all the participation forms were signed, randomly generated, 
unique four digit numbers were assigned to each questionnaire using the same online random 
number generation tool used in the trial (Urbaniak & Plous, 2013). Care was taken to make certain 
none of the random numbers in the main questionnaire matched any numbers generated for the 
trial questionnaire. Here again a cross-reference sheet linking the participant to the forms unique 
number was kept until the interview was completed. Upon completion of the full interview schedule, 
the cross-reference sheet was destroyed, thus guaranteeing confidentiality for the participants. 
The questions were presented in the format laid out in the interview schedule, but using the newly 
adapted prompt cards allowed the interviewee to concentrate on each question in turn. Each 
participant was encouraged to expand on their answers allowing the use of personal experiences or 
anecdotes that were captured with the use of a voice recorder for later transcription and analysis.      
 
4.10 Analysis of Data and Interpretation of Findings 
As the researcher, had spent much of the interview process focused on listening to the participants 
and recording their responses, there was a substantial volume of data to be analysed. Unlike 
quantitative data, there is little consensus as to how qualitative data should be analysed and 
interpreted (Silverman, 2006, 2011; Yin, 2013).  Thus, to make certain the analysis was performed to 
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the highest standard, the researcher followed Yin (2013) principles of “good research”. Yin notes 
that components of qualitative analysis that scholars do agree upon are that the analysis should 
involve a degree of classifying, tabulating and examination of the data to make certain the responses 
address the initial research questions.  
The analysis of the recorded data was a continual process throughout the thesis. The audio 
recordings were able to be reviewed shortly after the actual interview, allowing the identification of 
both emerging and common themes. From the discussions that had been recorded, positive 
responses were areas where clinicians had agreed “always” or “often” and negative responses 
matched the prompt cards categories of “seldom” or “never”.  The themes, patterns and issues that 
emerged from the quantitative data were manually transcribed to cards and sorted into individually 
themed groups. These groups were later sorted into specific categories matching the five thesis 
questions in the same manner as the quantitative responses (Sommer & Sommer, 1991). Because of 
the nature of the responses and the audio recording of them, a number of direct quotes are 
presented in this thesis to provide broader contextual information to the analysis. These quotes 
allow for an added descriptive depth, providing greater insight to this research (Eisenhart & Howe, 
1992; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003). Throughout this process there was a constant challenge 
to not lose or misplace any vital information or take a comment out of context, thus placing a 
different meaning to the words (Punch, 2013).   
The numerical data results were transcribed, digitised, and analysed using routine methods. This 
data was transposed into graphical format and is presented and discussed along with the 
quantitative results within Chapter 5. 
 
4.11 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has put forward the definitions of both qualitative and quantitative research and why 
given the audience for the research, a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative questions were 
presented in the questionnaire. It has explained the reason why a semi structured technique was 
chosen and laid out how these decisions directed the layout and design of the questionnaire. It also 
justifies the strategic direction of the inquiry used for this project, a case study method using 
interviews with both quantitative and qualitative analyses.  
This chapter also explained why the sample size was chosen and who would be in this group. The 
initial pretesting of the interview schedule was explained, along with reasons why one of the smaller 
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departments situated on the fringes of the hospital campus was picked to run the trial. Finally, the 
manner of data collection, tabulation, analysis, and the means of interpretation of the research data 
was covered. 
The chapter also looks at the reasons why the board meeting minutes were reviewed, why the time 
period of 32 months was selected, and how the results from the board meeting analysis fitted in 
with the literature review of board in Section 3. This also looked at any interactions or presentations 
from the clinicians to the board in an educational manner.      
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Chapter 5 
Results 
5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter presented the method and ideas behind the capture of information from the 
clinicians at Christchurch Hospital. This chapter builds on the foundations laid in chapter 4, and is 
split into two main segments. The first of these segments analyses the results from the CDHB Board 
meetings for the two time periods covering 12 months prior to the September 2010 earthquake and 
24 months post the 2010 earthquake. The second segment presents the results from the 
questionnaire sectioned into the areas identified as effecting clinical efficiency and efficacy. These 
being the CDHB Board, Management, the MoH, Public engagement, views of various healthcare 
models outside New Zealand and a final section reporting on responses to personal questions. The 
results from the trial questionnaire allowed for refining of the process that saw the interview times 
extended from an average of 30 minutes to 52 minutes, an increase of 73% in interview time. This 
highlighted the need for the voice recorder allowing time more time for later analysis and 
transcription. The findings from the results will be discussed in greater details in chapter 6.  
 
5.2 CDHB Board Meeting Analysis 
Board meetings for the CDHB are held monthly, usually on a Thursday from 9 am at The Princess 
Margaret Hospital, Christchurch. Within a year there are 11 meetings from February through to 
December with no meetings in January allowing for the Christmas and New Year holidays. The Chair 
for September 2009 through till August 2010 meeting was Mr. Alister James. Chair for February 2012 
through October 2013 meetings was Mr. Bruce Matherson with deputy chair Mr. Peter Ballantyne 
standing in for Mr. Matherson during any absences.  Agendas for the board meetings are largely 
determined by the Board’s yearly work plan.  The Board Chair agrees each agenda prior to release 
and there is no limit to the number of agenda items.  
Table 6 shown below is split into a left potion for Board meeting results from the period pre-
September 2010 earthquake and a right portion for post 2010 earthquake. The results looked at four 
areas for each of the points presented within the agendas and minutes for the periods covered. Did 
each of the points on the agenda create discussion at the board meeting (Points Discussed – Yes or 
No)? For each of the points on the agenda, was there more than one option offered (Options 
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Offered – Yes or No)? For each of the points on the agenda, was the motion passed or not (Motion 
Passed – Yes or No)? Finally, how many times for each of the points on the agenda did the Board 
request more information. “RFI – Yes or No”.   
Table 6 - Summary of Board minutes covering Points, Options and Motion 
September 2009 through August 2010        February 2012 through October 2013 
 Points 
Discussed 
Options 
offered 
Motion 
Passed 
RFI 
 Points 
Discussed 
Options 
offered 
Motion 
Passed 
RFI 
No 
45 
48% 
92 
99% 
1 
1% 
90 
97% 
 48 
44% 
107 
99% 
1 
1% 
94 
87% 
Yes 
48 
52% 
1 
1% 
92 
99% 
3 
3% 
 60 
56% 
1 
1% 
107 
99% 
14 
13% 
 
Ninety nine percent of Motions on the agendas for both periods are moved and seconded (passed) 
even though 3% of those in the 2009 to 2010 period requested more information and 13% in the 
2012 – 2013 period.  What this does highlight is the increase of the number of times more 
information was requested. Though this may also highlight areas where the board, not being fully 
equipped with the clinical or healthcare management knowledge, are to a degree engaging in a form 
of rubber stamping and generally going along with decisions put forward by both the specialist 
within the healthcare system and the MoH (Kemp, 2006; Laugesen & Gauld, 2012, p. 141). This also 
fits with the idea put forward by Patton and Baker (1987) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) that boards 
may ask for more information but they do not like to “rock the boat” and will generally agree with 
the proposal.  
Within the meeting minutes, motions passed are recorded in the following manner using one or all 
of the points noted in the table below:  
Table 7 - Grounds for passing Board meeting resolutions 
ground(s) for the passing of this resolution 
Reference – Official 
Information Act 
1982 (Section 9) 
Protect the privacy of natural persons. S9(2)(a) 
To carry on, without prejudice or disadvantage, 
negotiations (including commercial and industrial 
negotiations). 
S9(2)(j) 
Maintain legal professional privilege. S9(2)(h) 
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During the pre-earthquake period of September 2009 to August 2010, 52% of the proposals put to 
the Board resulted in some form of discussion. This figure had risen to 56% for the two years’ post-
earthquake. The number of options offered for each point had not made any noticeable change 
between the two periods, staying level at 1% of points presented having more than one option for 
consideration. Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) also noted that only 1% of the issues from the 
Board meetings studied within their research had more than one option to review.   
It is worth highlighting the differences between the Board of the CDHB and the eleven organisations 
covered in the study by Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, none of which were directly involved in the 
delivery of healthcare. Unlike the Boards reviewed in Israel, were all members were appointed, the 
DHB members are a mix of both elected and Government appointed.  
Table 8 is set out in a manner similar to table 6, split into a left column for Board meeting results 
from a period pre-the September 2010 earthquake and a right column for results relating to the 
period post 2010 earthquake. Within this analysis, the research looked into areas where the Board 
was able to interact with other members of the CDHB via presentations, deputation and discussions 
(as measured by pages of minutes). These were not restricted to only clinical or surgical, but were 
able to come from other areas within the CDHB. Presentations seemed to be a chance to educate 
the Board about the work or programmes being run within those specialist areas. Deputations were 
usually made by one or two people and were usually addressing a very specific point on behalf of an 
area or group. The total number of presentations and deputations for the period are presented, 
along with an average per meeting. The number of pages for the meeting minutes were also 
counted as a whole for the period as well as an average for the number of meetings.         
Table 8 - Board meetings, Presentations, Deputations and Discussions.    
 September 2009 through 
August 2010 (12) 
February 2012 through 
October 2013 (20) 
Total Presentations 5 24 
Average Presentations 0.4 1.2 
Total Deputations 2 4 
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Average Deputations 0.16 0.2 
Total Pages 109 1705 
Average Pages 9 85 
Average Discussions 8 5 
        
Where the numbers did change more markedly after the earthquake were in the number of 
presentations put to the Board. This leapt from five in the 12 months’ pre-quake, to 24 in the 20 
months following the earthquake. With an average of 0.4 presentations per meeting in the pre-
quake period, the average increases by 200% resulting in an average of 1.2 presentations post-
quake. Amongst these were a large proportion of information technology projects highlighting the 
impact of the earthquake on clinical and surgical areas and the importance of sharing electronic 
patient information. Along with this was recognition of a need for instant access to patient’s medical 
records during any emergency that could bypass the delays caused when accessing historical paper 
records held in secure archives, often away from the hospital campus (Ardagh et al., 2012).   
Understandably, the number of financial requests for major building work proposals that were being 
presented post-quake increased. As the CDHB suffered damage to all its hospital sites, including 
those in Ashburton, this is not surprising. Many of these requests were financial substantial and as 
such Board approval was required before work could proceed.     
One of the other factors of the CDHB Board meetings, and a point raised by Schwartz-Ziv and 
Weisbach, was that Board meeting minutes only list discussion that takes place during the official 
meeting. This would not include any time spent in discussions that take place before the meeting 
starts. In the case of the CDHB, discussions that may take place during the breaks for morning tea, or 
during lunch. Even though the monthly Board meetings are open to the public, the public are 
excluded from certain portions of the meetings. There is no mention of any member(s) of the public 
making an appearance at any of the meetings. Board meeting times did not differ between the two 
time-frames reviewed. Meetings commenced at 9 am, and were set to finish at midday or 12.30 pm, 
followed by lunch and a chance for informal conversation.   
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5.3 Questionnaire Results 
The invitations were individually delivered to each of the clinicians identified in the selection process 
in mid-January 2015. The interview process did not commence until March 2015 as many of the 
senior clinicians do not take time off over Christmas and New Year as this period is one of the busiest 
for the hospital. Because of the increase in patients during December and January many clinicians 
delay their summer holidays until February when the hospital is not so busy. Delaying the interviews 
until March allowed for this break. From the initial 37 invitations, 27 people (73%) agreed to be 
interviewed.  
All the tables within Section 5.2 list results in question order and display results of that question in 
both the number of respondents as well as the percentage of respondents against each reply option. 
This is shown on each table as n(%). The reason for this was to follow the layout in the questionnaire 
as closely as possible. For questions that allowed a scale response, the response number is also 
shown at the top of each column.      
 
5.3.1 Personal Questions 
The objectives of the last section of the research were aimed at gathering personal details regarding 
the clinicians.   
Table 9 - Questionnaire Section 6 Results n (%) 
6.1 How old are you? 
Average 
53 years 
Youngest 
35 years 
Oldest 
66 years 
Median 
55 years 
Mode 
55 years 
Range 
31 years 
6.2 
What ethnic group do you identify 
with?   
NZ 
22 (81) 
European 
4 (15) 
Something 
Else 
1 (4) 
   
6.3 Gender 
Male 
19 (70) 
Female 
8 (30) 
    
6.4 In what country did you first qualify?  
NZ 
21 (78) 
UK 
6 (22) 
    
6.5 
How long have you worked for the 
CDHB? 
Average 
21 years 
Shortest 
8 years 
Longest 
40 years 
Median 
19 years 
Mode 
15 years 
Range 
32 years 
 
From the responses, the average age of the senior clinician within the Christchurch hospital is 53, the 
medium and mode both being 55 years. The average years’ experience working in the CDHB was 21 
years, with the median 19 and the mode of 15 years. This would mean many of Senior Medical 
Officers interviewed would have been employed by what was then Canterbury Health Limited in 
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1994, and as such would have had experience in the troubles referred to as “The Bad Old Days” 
(Anonymous Healthcare Worker #1, 2015). 
One surprise was the ratio of males to females within the study group. Though females constitute a 
a large proportion of employees within the hospital, working within both the clinical and nursing 
areas, 70% of those who accepted this invitation to participate were male.  This was commented 
upon by one SMO who raised a point about the perceptions of a “glass ceiling” within the New 
Zealand healthcare system when it comes to openings for women. The same “glass ceiling” was 
highlighted in studies by McManus and Sproston (2000) and Zhuge, Kaufman, Simeone, Chen, and 
Velazquez (2011) within both the clinical and surgical specialities of healthcare. This research was 
not designed to look at the perceptions or limitations that may or may not be viewed by the female 
clinicians, though with these results, this could certainly be an area of further study.  The age range 
was just as surprising, with the youngest only 35 years, and the oldest 66. Lastly the length of the 
interview seemed to be positively correlated with the age of the interviewee -- older respondents 
took more time to reply during the interviews.    
 
5.3.2 CDHB Board and Relationship With Members 
The objectives of this section of the research were aimed at assessing the clinical relationship with 
the Board of the CDHB, and gaining a better understanding of the perceived role the Board should 
be performing from a clinical viewpoint.  The results from the first section of the questionnaire are 
shown in Table 10.  
Table 10 - Questionnaire Section 1 Results n (%) 
1.1 
Do you have any synergy with 
the Board? 
No 
15 (56%) 
Yes 
12 (44%) 
   
1.1a If yes, to what benefit  
1 
No benefit 
1 (8%) 
2 
 
1 (8%) 
3 
 
3 (25%) 
4 
 
4 (33%) 
5 
Very beneficial 
3 (25%) 
1.2 
Do you think the Board needs to 
represent the local population? 
No 
1 (4%) 
Yes 
26 (96%) 
   
1.3 
Do you think the elected Board 
members are a fair 
representation of the local 
population? 
1 
Not 
representative 
0 (0%) 
2 
 
 
6 (22%) 
3 
 
 
19 (70%) 
4 
 
 
2 (7%) 
5 
Completely 
representative 
0 (0%) 
1.4 
How effective is the Board at 
managing the delivery of 
healthcare? 
Poor 
2 (7%) 
Fair 
2 (7%) 
Average 
11 (41%) 
Good 
11 (41%) 
Excellent 
1 (4%) 
1.5 
Should the Board be primarily 
concerned with Supervising the 
delivery of Healthcare, 
Monitoring 
12 (44%) 
Supervising 
3 (11%) 
Something 
Else 
12 (44%) 
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Monitoring the delivery of 
health care, or Something else? 
1.6 
Do you think the Board 
enhances efficient practice of 
the CDHB? 
No 
9 (33%) 
Yes 
11 (41%) 
Don’t Know 
7 (26%) 
  
1.7 
Do you think the governance 
role should be performed by 
elected locals, or appointed 
experts 
Elected 
1 (4%) 
Appointed 
3 (11%) 
Both 
23 (85%) 
Not at all 
0 (0%) 
 
1.8 
Do you think the governance 
role should be performed by a 
Board or management? 
Board 
21 (78%) 
Management 
2 (7%) 
Mixed 
4 (15%) 
  
1.9 
Do you think the governance 
role should be performed locally 
or centrally? 
Locally 
10 (37%) 
Centrally 
1 (4%) 
Both 
16 (59%) 
  
 
It is evident that even though the numbers of clinicians having some form of synergy with the Board 
are less than those with no synergy, 44% compared 56%, contact with the board is viewed in a 
positive manner. Synergy was defined as any form of personnel or professional contact, discussions 
or meetings that relate to work done for, or on behalf of the CDHB. On a scale from 1 being of no 
benefit to 5 being very beneficial, 58% of those who responded said the meeting were above 
average (4) to very beneficial (5). This compares to 16% who responded with below average (2) to no 
benefit (1). The remaining 25% of respondents gave an average reply of (3) neither very beneficial 
nor of no benefit.   
Where clinicians were asked to explain why they had answered as they had, there was agreement 
that the Board were seen as a forum to counter what is often viewed from a clinical aspect as the 
“remote handling” of the health system by central Government. The following comment was made 
while also highlighting that the Board chair is appointed by the Minister of Health.  
There is a great need for a strong Board chair to stand up to both the MoH 
and the Minister of Health (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #7, 2015). 
When asked if the Board needs to represent the local population, question 1.2, an over-whelming 
majority (96%) of respondents replied that the Board does need to represent the local population. 
Yet question 1.3 asked if the board members are a fair representation of the local population, 70% 
of those who responded did so with average score of (3) from a scale of 1 to 5, (1) being not 
representative and (5) completely representative. Seven percent responded above average (4), no 
one responded with completely representative (5). This compares to 22% who responded with 
below average (2), while no one from the selected group responded that the elected board were not 
representative of the local population (1).     
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By enabling local representation, the clinicians expected what was described as “postcode medicine” 
to be addressed along with a greater degree of equity in the way healthcare was delivered to the 
local residents. But the clinicians who raised these points did so with the statement that local 
representation had been unable to correct these issues.       
A need to reduce postcode medicine (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #8, 
2015). 
This comment refers to the perception that some postal areas are getting better medical care than 
others.   
Needs to be greater equity over healthcare delivery (Anonymous 
Healthcare Worker #9, 2015). 
This may be viewed in the same manner as the comment on postcode medicine, but rather than 
covering set geographical areas, this was aimed at the ethnicity of those accessing medicine. The 
manner in which healthcare is delivered to certain ethnic groups may not be as culturally acceptable 
as the manner of delivery to others and in so doing there was a view that not all the healthcare 
benefits are fully achieved.      
As each DHB has different requirements and faces different issues, the clinicians interviewed 
believed the Board was able to act as the conduit between management and clinical governance 
groups within the CDHB and the decision-making powers in the MoH.  
Question 1.4 “How good is the board at managing the delivery of healthcare”, 14% responded with 
Poor (1) to Fair (2), 41% responded with average (3), and 45% responded with Good (4) to Excellent 
(5). Even though a greater percentage of clinicians have no synergy with the Board, 56%, there is a 
perception amongst the clinicians that the Board are doing a good job at managing the delivery of 
healthcare for the people of Canterbury.  
For question 1.5, 44% percent of respondents believed the Board should be involved with 
“monitoring” the delivery of healthcare, compared to 11% who believed they should be 
“supervising” the delivery of healthcare. The remaining 44% believed the Board should be involved 
in something other than “supervising” or “monitoring”, but were unable to state what that 
something else was.  One factor that was raised by a clinician that may affect the long-term role of 
the Board was a lack of any measurement or reporting to show if the Board was achieving the goals 
set out by Government.  
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Question 1.6, “Do you think the Board enhances efficient practice of the CDHB” had a greater 
percentage, 41%, responding “Yes” they do enhance the efficient practices of the CDHB, compared 
to 33% who responding “No” they do not enhance the efficiency of the CDHB. This must be 
tempered with a high percentage of don’t knows, 26%. 
The last three questions for this section asked for views on the governance role for the CDHB. 
Question 1.7, “Do you think the governance role should be performed by elected locals or appointed 
experts?” Question 1.8 “Do you think the governance role should be performed by a Board or 
Management?” and question 1.9 “Do you think the governance role should be performed locally or 
centrally?” Eight-five percent responded to question 1.7 saying this should be made up from a mix of 
both elected and appointed representatives. Seventy-eight percent responded to question 1.8 that 
governance should be managed by a Board, and 59% responded to question 1.9 that the 
responsibility should be performed both locally and centrally.  
It can be stated that clinicians surveyed think the Board is having a positive effect on the 
management of healthcare for the CDHB. That the Board should be both representative of the local 
population as well as having a number of elected professionals, though the present method of 
gaining some form of public representation could be changed. With only 41% of respondents 
agreeing that the Board enhances the efficient practice of the CDHB, and 44% of respondents 
uncertain as to the role of the board when it comes to the delivery of healthcare, now may a good 
time to look at the Board model recently implemented by the primary healthcare sector within 
Canterbury. 
The following definition of primary healthcare is taken from the MoH web site and goes on to state:       
Primary health care relates to the professional health care provided in the 
community, usually from a general practitioner (GP), practice nurse, 
pharmacist or other health professional working within a general practice 
(Ministry of Health, 2014b). 
The manner in which the primary and secondary health sectors manage public participation was 
raised by a senior hospital clinician who highlighted that the primary healthcare sector has moved 
away from an elected public Board and adopted a more conciliatory, advisory Board. 
The Primary Health Sector in Christchurch replaced the public Board with a 
community advisory Board (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #10, 2015). 
The Board were seen as the group who were “Steering the ship so to speak” (Anonymous Healthcare 
Worker #1, 2015) 
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5.3.3 CDHB Management 
The objectives of this section of the research were aimed at assessing the clinical relationship with 
the management of the CDHB. Gaining a better understanding of the perceived role of management 
with the running of the hospital, and whether clinicians felt that they should be taking a greater 
lead, or being jointly involved with the management teams.   
Table 11 - Questionnaire Section 2 Results n (%)  
2.1 
Do you meet with 
CDHB senior 
management? 
No 
5 (19) 
Yes 
22 (81) 
    
2.1a If yes, how often? 
Daily 
3 (14) 
Weekly 
5 (23) 
Fortnightly 
3 (14) 
Monthly 
6 (27) 
Quarterly 
2 (9) 
Longer 
3 (14) 
2.1b If yes, about what? 
Clinical 
1 (5) 
Operational 
4 (18) 
Personnel 
0 (0) 
All 3 
17 (77) 
Something 
Else 
0 (0) 
 
2.2 
How effective is DHB 
management at the 
delivery of Healthcare 
to Canterbury? 
1 
 
Not effective 
0 (0) 
2 
 
 
1 (4) 
3 
 
 
4 (15) 
4 
 
 
17 (63) 
5 
Very 
effective 
5 (19) 
 
2.3 
Do you think the 
present management 
structure is effective 
managing clinical 
operations? 
1 
 
Not effective 
0 (0) 
2 
 
 
3 (11) 
3 
 
 
10 (37) 
4 
 
 
13 (48) 
5 
Very 
effective 
1 (4) 
 
2.4 
Do you think 
clinicians should have 
a greater role in 
Healthcare 
management? 
No 
5 (19) 
Yes 
22 (81) 
    
2.5 
In your experience, 
are management 
responsive to clinical 
concerns? 
1 
 
Unresponsive 
1 (4) 
2 
 
 
3 (11) 
3 
 
 
7 (26) 
4 
 
 
14 (52) 
5 
Totally 
responsive 
2 (7) 
 
2.6 
Do you think 
Healthcare for 
Canterbury should be 
managed locally, or 
centrally 
Locally 
13 (48) 
Centrally 
0 (0) 
Mixed 
14 (52) 
   
 
 
Interaction between clinicians and management showed that 81% of respondents meet with 
management, and the majority of these meetings happen month or sooner (78%). From these 
meetings 77% of respondents cover most aspects that may affect a senior clinician, being clinical, 
operational and personnel. Of the remaining respondents, 9% meet with management quarterly and 
14% go longer than 3 months between meetings.  In comparison to the 77% of clinicians who meet 
management on clinical, operational and personnel matters, 5% cover only clinical matters and 18% 
only operational matters.  
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The result from question 2.2, giving a scalar response from (1) not effective to (5) very effective, 
showed that the management teams could be seen as effectively managing the delivery of 
healthcare for Canterbury. With 82% responding with above average (4) to very effective (5), 15% of 
those that responded did so with an average score of 3, and 4% responded with below average (2). 
No one responded saying management were not effective (1).    
Question 2.3 presented another scalar response to the effectiveness of management to clinical 
operations. The scale was the same as that in 2.2 with (1) being not effective to (5) very effective. Of 
those who responded 37% believe the management are doing an average job managing clinical 
operations (3), 52% responded with above average (4) to very effective (5) and 11% with below 
average (2). None of the clinicians responded with a ranking of (1) not effective. The following 
comment from an interviewee highlighted the constructive approach taken by the CDHB.  
There is no management and clinicians within the management teams, its 
clinical and non-clinical working in partnership (Anonymous Healthcare 
Worker #4, 2015). 
Even though the response shows that management are perceived as far more effective today, 
compared to “the bad old days” in mid to late 1990’s one comment stands out and was relevant to 
many of the smaller clinical units.  
Management and the Board need to visit clinical sites more often to get a 
greater appreciation of what each clinical department actually does, and 
some of the issues they face (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #1, 2015).          
This feeling that things are presently better now than have been in the past was backed up with the 
following quote from one of the more Senior Medical Officers.  
Do not change or reorganise for the sake of re-organising as clinical staff 
are very much against restructures / re-organisation, as this has a tendency 
to adversely affect patient care (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #5, 2015). 
Though this could also be viewed in a different light, one that looks at the impacts of organisational 
change from a patient perspective. Reviewing what has happened in the past for the CDHB, 
reorganisation in the 1990s did result in adverse patient events.  
For many of the clinicians there were comments that the Christchurch hospital campus was 
somewhat remote from the administration centre based at The Princess Margaret Hospital. The two 
teams, senior management and the Board, were often viewed as faceless aspects of the CDHB 
governance committees.   
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When asked if clinicians should have a greater role in healthcare management, question 2.4, the 
response was a resounding yes from 81% compared to only 19% saying no. To support the idea that 
clinicians should be engaged within the healthcare management of the CDHB, clinicians are 
encouraged to step up and aid the management teams by allowing a percentage of their working 
time to be devoted to non-clinical activities. This was highlighted by one of the following 
interviewees who said:  
30% of a senior clinicians time is allowed for non-clinical work (Anonymous 
Healthcare Worker #6, 2015) 
 
One of the great advantages clinicians have over the management teams was also highlighted:  
 
Clinicians often work in many physical locations within the New Zealand 
DHB system, as well as within the primary and private sectors of New 
Zealand. Many have worked overseas experiencing the range of both 
centralised Government managed systems, to individually managed, 
private hospitals. On average, the DHB management teams have not had 
such varied health experience (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #11, 2015) 
The question on managements responsiveness to clinical concerns, question 2.5, presented a scalar 
response of (1) unresponsive to (5) totally responsive. Clinicians who replied to this question gave 
results of 59% of (4) above average to (5) totally responsive, 26% as (3) average and 15% (2) below 
average to (1) unresponsive. This positive reply to managements responsiveness to clinical concerns 
may link back to the statement of “clinical and non-clinical working in partnership” (Anonymous 
Healthcare Worker #4, 2015) and how this has fostered a closer relationship between the two 
groups.  
Responding to question 2.6 “Do you think Healthcare for Canterbury should be managed locally or 
centrally?” 52% of those who responded favoured a mixture of locally and centrally organised 
system compared with 48% of those who responded favouring a local management structure. None 
of the clinicians interviewed thought the system should be centrally managed in a manner similar to 
the UK. These responses came with a degree of experience of the British NHS system as 74% of 
those interviewed had worked in the NHS in England or Scotland at some time.        
Below are a few of the comments that were raised while covering the questions in Section 2 of the 
questionnaire.    
The greater the DHBs grow the less effective they are at delivering local 
healthcare and acting on local issues (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #12, 
2015) 
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More management = less efficiency, Less management = greater efficiency 
(Anonymous Healthcare Worker #12, 2015) 
This comment was echoed many departments who may be considered small to mid-sized when 
looking at the numbers of clinical employees, yet are no less important when dealing with the health 
and wellbeing of the Canterbury public.                 
Management do not see the need for some of the small specialist areas, 
yet when these areas are viewed nationally by the Ministry of Health, they 
are classed as clinically important for the wellbeing of New Zealand, and 
New Zealanders (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #1, 2015). 
The conflict around regional and national funding for certain clinical initiatives was something that 
came up time and time again during the interviews. This was often seen as something outside the 
sphere of many clinicians influence and unsupported by both management and the Board.        
Regional initiatives are often poorly funded (Anonymous Healthcare 
Worker #13, 2015). 
National and greater regional initiatives need to be top sliced for funding 
and not have it taken from the DHB budget (Anonymous Healthcare 
Worker #13, 2015). 
 
5.3.4 The Ministry of Health 
The objectives of this section of the research were aimed at assessing the clinical relationship with 
the MoH. How much influence the MoH have over clinical decisions, and if the CDHB has a degree of 
leeway when implementing healthcare policy created by the MoH.   
Table 12 - Questionnaire Section 3 Results n (%) 
3.1 
How much influence do you 
have on healthcare policy 
created by the MoH? 
1 
No influence 
7 (26) 
2 
 
11 (41) 
3 
 
4 (15) 
4 
 
4 (15) 
5 
Great Influence 
1 (4) 
3.2 
Do you think clinicians 
should have a greater say in 
MoH policy decisions? 
No 
6 (22) 
Yes 
21 (78) 
   
3.3 
How much leeway does the 
DHB have when 
implementing MoH policy? 
1 
None 
3 (11) 
2 
 
9 (33) 
3 
 
9 (33) 
4 
 
5 (19) 
5 
Great Leeway 
1 (4) 
3.4 
Do you think the MoH 
should have less, or more 
say in how the CDHB 
prioritises clinical 
initiatives? 
Less 
9 (33) 
More 
2 (7) 
Balanced 
16 (59) 
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3.5 
How much impact does the 
MoH have on your clinical 
decisions? 
1 
None 
8 (30) 
2 
 
12 (44) 
3 
 
4 (15) 
4 
 
2 (7) 
5 
Complete control 
1 (4) 
 
Question 3.1 was again set out in a scalar rating from (1) no influence to (5) great influence. The 
response to 3.1 regarding clinicians influence on the creation of Ministry policy showed that even 
though the clinicians selected were the most senior within their field operating from Christchurch 
hospital. That many of them were working in a number of other hospitals around the South Island in 
a similar role, 67% of those who responded felt they had (2) below average to (1) no influence on 
MoH healthcare policy creation. At the other end of the scale only 19% percent of those who 
responded felt they had (4) above average to (5) great influence over the creation of MoH 
healthcare policy. The remaining 15% of those who responded felt they had (3) average influence on 
the creation of MoH healthcare policy.   
When asked if clinicians should have a greater say in policy decisions, question 3.2, the majority, 
78% of those who responded, said they should have a greater say in MoH policy decisions. The 
remaining 22% said that the clinicians did not need a greater say in MoH policy decisions. Expanding 
this question and asking how clinicians could have a greater voice in MoH policy decisions, it was felt 
this could be better achieved via the Council of Medical Colleges (CMC) rather than via individuals 
themselves.  The following is taken from the CMC web site.  
The Council of Medical Colleges is the recognised, trusted and authoritative 
collective voice for the Medical Colleges in New Zealand. CMC is able to 
provide well-informed opinions and advice to Ministers, Government 
agencies and other relevant bodies on health, post graduate medical 
training, and workforce issues (“Council of Medical Colleges,” 2012) 
©Council of Medical Colleges 2012.  
Question 3.3, asking how much leeway the CDHB has when implementing MoH policy, again offered 
a scalar response of (1) none, to (5) great leeway. Of those who responded, 44% answered (2) below 
average to (1) none, 23% answered (4) above average to (5) great leeway. While 33% thought the 
CDHB had (3) average leeway when implementing MoH policy.  
Question 3.4, do you think the MoH should have less or more say in way the CDHB prioritises clinical 
initiatives was answered by 33% of respondents favouring less, 7% more and 59% felt there is a 
reasonable balance at present. Overall, regardless of national policies driven by the MoH, or changes 
in Governments and a shift in healthcare, the effects on clinical decisions was viewed as minimal. 
Question 3.5 offered a scalar response from (1) none to (5) complete control asking how much 
impact does the MoH have on your clinical decisions. Of those who responded 74% felt there was (2) 
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below average to (1) no effect, 11% (4) above average to (5) complete control and 15% responding 
(3) average impact. When the clinicians were asked to expand on why and how, it became apparent 
that the feelings towards the MoH was not quite so cordial. Many clinicians seemed to regard the 
Ministry as an entity that is putting too many ineffective and inefficient regulations with little to no 
monitoring of the effects or those regulations. At times, some of the comments regarding the MoH 
could be compared to those expressed during the 1990s battle between the CDHB Board, 
management, and the clinicians. Regardless of any feeling of antipathy to the MoH, comparing this 
to the answer to question 2.6 “Do you think Healthcare for Canterbury should be managed locally, or 
centrally?” The response was slightly in favour of a mix of both locally and centrally, and at present 
this central body is the MoH.  
 
5.3.5 Public Engagement 
The objectives of this section of the research were aimed at assessing how the clinicians viewed 
public input when it comes to managing the CDHB, and if the Board chamber was seen as the best 
place for public debate.   
 
Table 13 - Questionnaire Section 4 Results n (%) 
4.1 
Should the public have any influence in how their 
DHB is run? 
1 
No influence 
1 (4) 
2 
 
4 (15) 
3 
 
6 (22) 
4 
 
12 (44) 
5 
Great influence 
4 (15) 
4.2 
Do you think the Board chamber is the best place 
for a public debate on healthcare? 
No 
22 (81) 
Yes 
5 (19) 
   
 
The area of public engagement is something many health systems around the world constantly 
struggle with and New Zealand is no different. As pointed out earlier, the turn out in the last local 
body elections for the CDHB Board was one of the lowest on record. Yet the majority of clinicians 
believe that the public should have some influence on how their DHB is run. Question 4.1 asked if 
the public should have any influence on how their DHB is run, this was responded via a scale rating 
of (1) no influence to (5) great influence. Fifty-nine percent of clinicians interviewed responded by 
saying the public should have (4) above average to (5) great influence. This compares to only 19% 
who said the public should have (2) below average to (1) no influence. The remaining 22% 
responded with (3).   
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Once the public Board is elected, they may then be seen as the public voice within the CDHB, which 
may explain why 81% of respondents to question 4.2 did not think that the Board chamber was the 
best place to hold a public debate on healthcare.  
 
5.3.6 Your Experience of Different Health Models 
The objectives of this section of the research was aimed at assessing the variety of differing 
healthcare systems clinicians have worked within, and comparing those healthcare systems to the 
system in place in New Zealand.    
Table 14 - Questionnaire Section 5 Results n (%)  
5.1 Have you worked solely in New Zealand? 
No 
23 (85) 
Yes 
4 (15) 
    
5.1a Where else have you worked? 
UK 
20 (87) 
Aus 
11 (48) 
South 
Africa 
2 (9) 
Canada 
2 (9) 
USA 
2 (9) 
Zim 
1 (4) 
5.1b 
Which healthcare model is better suited to 
you 
NZ 
26 (96) 
Aus 
1 (4) 
    
5.1c How does the DHB model compare 
1 
Less 
effective 
0 (0) 
2 
 
 
1 (4) 
3 
 
 
5 (22) 
4 
 
 
13 (57) 
5 
Very 
effective 
4 (17) 
 
5.2 
How effective is the DHB model at 
delivering optimum healthcare for 
Christchurch? 
1 
Not 
effective 
0 (0) 
2 
 
 
0 (0) 
3 
 
 
5 (19) 
4 
 
 
18 (67) 
5 
Very 
effective 
4 (15) 
 
 
 
Nb: The results to question 5.1a total to a figure greater than the number of clinicians surveyed. This 
is because many of the clinicians have worked in more than one country, so the same clinician may 
be registered against one or all of those shown.  Also, the percent figure shown is a percentage of all 
the clinicians interviewed and not a percentage of those who answered No to question 5.1. The 
follow quote supports the high percentage of clinicians who answered No to question 5.1:  
Clinicians often work in many physical locations within the New Zealand 
DHB system, as well as within the Primary and Private sectors of New 
Zealand. Many have worked overseas experiencing the range of both 
centralised Government managed systems, to individually managed, 
private hospitals. On average, the DHB management teams have not had 
such varied health experience (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #14, 2015). 
For the 15% of respondents who had not worked outside New Zealand, questions 5.1a, b and c were 
skipped over. The 85% of clinicians who had worked outside New Zealand in a role as a clinician, 74% 
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have worked in the NHS in the UK, 41% in Australia, 7% in South Africa, 7% in Canada and the USA 
and 4% in Zimbabwe. Ninety-six percent responded that the New Zealand system was the one they 
felt better suited to them, the remaining only 4% responded that another healthcare system was 
better suited to their form of medicine. Ranking the CDHB against other healthcare systems they had 
experienced was done using a scale response of (1) less effective to (5) very effective. Seventy-four 
percent responded that the CDHB was (4) above average to (5) very effective, with 4% responding 
with (2) below average, and none responding with (1) less effective. The remaining 22% responded 
with a score of 3.   
The effectiveness of the DHB model to deliver optimal healthcare for Christchurch, question 5.2, was 
also done using a scale response of (1) not effective to (5) very effective. The results were 
resoundingly positive with 82% responding with (4) above average to (5) very effective and 0% 
responding with (2) below average or (1) not effective. Nineteen percent of those who responded 
did so with (3). The following comment was made as a comparison between secondary healthcare 
and the Public Health sector.   
Public health is a poor cousin and often homeless when dealing with the 
Minister and MoH (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #15, 2015). 
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Chapter 6 
Summation of findings  
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter presented the resulting information from the questionnaire survey of senior 
clinicians from Christchurch hospital, this chapter expands on those results, discussing the findings 
and expands on how these link to the research laid out in chapters 2 and 3. To manage this the 6 
sections from the questionnaire are linked to the core structural concepts that underpin the 
research, these being the administrative distinction between the Boards or management, elected 
versus appointed memberships, centralised versus decentralised structure, and the degree of public 
participation. This chapter concludes with a summary of the findings, looking back to the four key 
questions set out in Section 1.5, concluding with areas that could be researched in greater detail.       
   
6.2 Boards or Management 
The objectives of this section of research was to review the findings from the questionnaire 
concerned with either the CDHB Board or management teams and link these findings back to 
previous studies highlighted from the literature review in Chapters 2 and 3.  To establish what if any 
relationship the clinicians have with either the Board of governance for the CDHB and the 
management team and to use this to answer if governance should be a role for the Board, or if this 
role is better to be managed by the management teams and if so what role is left for the Board.  
Within the Board meeting analysis, the time spent on Board discussions has moved post-earth quake 
to cover a greater number of matters regarding finance, which may highlight a shift from the original 
philanthropic-style seen in the late 1800s to a style more in line with corporate organisations. This 
seems to agree with (Scally & Donaldson, 1998, p. 61) who found that within the NHS “board 
agendas and management meetings have become dominated by financial issues and activity 
targets.” This realignment of the Board of the CDHB again highlights a greater requirement of the 
Board for financial management and guidance yet a lack of these very requirements was noted by 
Laugesen and Gauld (2012, p. 11) saying that many candidates holding the elected Board positions 
with the New Zealand DHB system lack the skills sets to fully perform the roles expected of them.  
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The results of the analysis of the CDHBs minutes show that on average, 99% of all motions are 
accepted. These findings agree with the Israeli study that found boards usually go along with the 
CEO wishes (Schwartz-Ziv & Weisbach, 2013) and often the boards only options are to accept or 
reject a specific proposal made by management (Chakraborty & Yilmaz, 2010; A. Patton & Baker, 
1987). The number of options offered to the CDHB board were no different. Pre-the 2010 
earthquake 98% of points discussed had only a single option to consider. Post the 2010 earthquake 
this figure was unchanged at 99% of points discussed having only a single option to consider.          
The number of points that created general discussion increased from 52% pre-2010 earthquake to 
56% post the 2010 earthquake. The largest change between the pre-and post-quake board meeting 
was with the number of requests for information. Pre-2010 earthquake this was recorded at only 
3%, compared to 12% post 2010 earthquake.  At the same time as the board were seen to request 
more information, the number of presentations put forward to the board jumped from 5 pre-2010 
earthquake to 24 in the time studied post 2010 earthquake. Even though the board may be seen as 
requesting more information, and even questioning the points put forward in the minutes, the 
number of motions passed during the meetings remained the same at 98-99%, and here again this is 
in agreement with the findings from Schwartz-Ziv, Weisbach, Patton and Baker.  
When asking clinicians how effective the Board are managing the delivery of healthcare for the 
CDHB, 81% of respondents rating the Board with a 3 or 4, with only 4% excellent (5). When asked 
how the Board may perform the role required to manage the delivery of healthcare, whether the 
role should be more aligned to the monitoring or supervising of the delivery of healthcare, the result 
showed that 88% of those responding was evenly split between monitoring the delivery of health 
care and something else. Of the 44% of clinicians who responded with Something else to question 
1.5 “Should the board be primarily concerned with Supervising the delivery of Healthcare, 
Monitoring the delivery of health care, or Something else?” eight out of the twelve made comments 
that at present the Board are often involved in both a supervising and monitoring role. This may 
align with the findings by Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013), where Boards within the corporate 
sector are often split into the two distinct types. The questionnaire did not expand on what the 44% 
of clinicians responding to question 1.5, should the Board be primarily concerned with Supervising 
the delivery of healthcare, Monitoring the delivery of healthcare, or something else, thought 
something else was.  
When questioned if the Board enhances the efficient practice of the CDHB, results were mixed, 41% 
of respondents saying yes, the Board enhanced the efficient practice of the CDHB where 33% of 
respondents said they did not enhance the efficient practice of the CDHB. Twenty five percent of 
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respondents answered “Don’t know”, while much of the feedback when expanding the question 
asking why or why not, centred around improved efficiency of the CDHB as a whole. The Board were 
seen as the group who were “Steering the ship so to speak” (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #1, 
2015), and improvements made within clinical areas inside the Christchurch hospital can be seen as 
something that have been allowed to happen as a result of the actions from both the Board and 
management. Without the Board and management working together in this way, these 
improvements may not have happened in the manner that they did. This can be tempered with the 
following that was put forward as a manner in which improvements and efficiency gains is slowed, 
or at times stifled, causing both frustration and a degree of concern: 
Both decisions and initiatives are very slow to filter down from the Board 
due to the great number and committees, sub committees and HAG 
(Hospital Advisory Group) meetings (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #2, 
2015) 
The governance role was something clinicians believed the Board and not management should be 
responsible for. Question 1.8 returned 77% in favour of the Board, but this role should be done with 
a mixture of local and central Government input, question 1.9, returning 59% in favour of a mixed 
role. The present selection process for locally elected members links back to question both the 
ability to fully represent those locals who have elected the members, as well as the skill sets of the 
elected members to perform the governance roll required within one of the south islands largest 
and most complex organisations (Birchfield & Mueller, 2010; Laugesen & Gauld, 2012, p. 11). These 
results may agree with the findings in the section on centralised or decentralized governance 
structure where Liesbet and Gary (2003) and Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003) claimed there is as yet 
no general consensus on how this can be achieved or which leads to higher performance output.  
The relationship between management and clinicians was more established than that between the 
Board and clinicians with 81% of clinicians meeting on a regular basis with management compared 
to 44% who any synergy with the Board. This was also reflected in the perceived efficiency of the 
management teams, 82% of clinicians surveyed responding with good to excellent for management 
effectiveness at the delivery of healthcare to Canterbury, compared to 45% of those who responded 
thought the Board were good to excellent at managing the delivery of healthcare. Eighty-one 
percent of the clinicians that responded believed that there was a place for the clinicians to take a 
greater role in healthcare management. This view of clinicians and management working together 
was summed up by a clinician in the following statement:  
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There is no management and clinicians, its clinical and non-clinical working 
in partnership (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #4, 2015).  
How this partnership can be strengthened again opens an area of further research as the longer a 
clinician spends on management tasks, the less time that clinician has to spend on clinical tasks. 
Encouraging clinicians into a greater role alongside those of management does seem to be 
recognised by the CDHB management with the following practice allowed for clinicians. 
30% of a senior clinicians time is allowed for non-clinical work (Anonymous 
Healthcare Worker #6, 2015).  
Time spent on management tasks is highlighted in Section 3.3.2. where Thorne (1997) noted the 
potential threat to the clinician’s professional identity, autonomy and collegiality, and Smith (1955) 
outlined the dual roles of authority created as clinicians taken on more management tasks becoming 
accountable to both management and clinical structures.    
Though there is nothing to say this time must be spent assisting management, a few of the clinicians 
who did respond use this time to clear paperwork and catching up on clinical studies and reports 
that build up over the weeks and months. An area highlighted in the literature review, Section 3.2.1. 
that may help to strengthen the argument for management over Boards, was the fact that 
healthcare workers may have a tenancy to undermine Boards by constantly questioning their ability 
to relate too, or identify too the very healthcare system they are associated with (Martin, 2008b).  
As the Board seem to be spending more and more time on financial matters for the CDHB, as 
highlighted in Section 5.1 there could be case to say that Boards have moved away from the 
philanthropic-style of the late 1800 towards a more corporate style often seen within many non-
government organisations. With the declining turnout for local body elections it could be argued 
that the public no longer values the election process for the DHB Boards and that the election 
process as it stands may be excluding large sections of society. If so this would agree with the 
findings from the NHS (Pfeffer, 1995) where public forums may activly seek to exclude the very 
public they represent by classifiying them as “special interests” (Pfeffer, 1995) and that excluding 
them is “often done for their own good” (Littlewood, 2001; Prior, 1999). With the lack of the desired 
skill sets of the elected members (Barnes et al., 2003) now may be a good time to review if the 
elected members of the Boards of the DHBs are still required in their present format.  The following 
is extracted from the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 (2015) 
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The Board of a DHB must delegate to the Chief Executive Officer of the 
DHB, under clause 39 of Schedule 3, the power to make decisions on 
management matters relating to the DHB.   
With a perceived lack of governance and guidance experience provided by the elected Board 
members, elected Boards could be removed altogether and any supervisory role done by the 
Ministry of Health in Wellington, who already monitor DHB performance. The Public Health and 
Disabilities Act goes on to state:   
The Minister may give a direction to all DHBs to comply with stated 
requirements for the purpose of supporting Government (New Zealand 
Public Health and Disability Act 2000, 2015) 
With 44% of clinicians responding that the DHB had (2) below average to (1) no leeway when 
implementing MoH policy and 78% saying they or the Council of Medical Colleges should have a 
greater say in MoH policy decisions. The removal of the elected Board representing the general 
public could be enacted at the same time as the CMC were allowed a greater voice in the MoHs 
directional healthcare decision making process as well as aiding with the supervision of DHBs in how 
these decisions are implemented. The MoH presently monitors a DHB and the Minister has the 
power to remove a Board and replace them with a commissioner:   
Where the Minister is seriously dissatisfied with the performance of a 
board of a DHB, the Minister may, by written notice to the board and the 
commissioner, dismiss all members of the board and replace the board 
with a commissioner (New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, 
2015). 
The Government has recently taken such steps when it removed the Board from the Southern 
District Health Board in June of 2015 citing an operating deficit of between 30 and 42 million New 
Zealand dollars.  This was quoted as accounting for over half the combined deficit of the remaining 
20 DHBs (Foden & Weaver, 2015). Patton and Baker (1987) argued that boards more often refuse to 
rock the boat, which generally results in a Board agreeing with the directions put forward by the 
CEO, though they may ask for further information (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). 
 
6.3 Elected or Appointed  
The objectives of this section of research was to review the make-up or structure of the Board of the 
CDHB. Should the Board be fully appointed by the central Government, fully elected by the local 
population, or would a mixture of elected and appointed representative offer a better solution, or is 
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there another alternative. From the answer to the questionnaire section about governance being 
performed by elected locals or appointed experts, 85% of the clinicians who responded said there 
should be a dual role of both elected locals and appointed experts. But with local support for the 
CDHB Board elections declining, as shown in local body election turnouts in figure 5, Section 3.2.3, it 
seems as if the same level of support for local representatives may not be as important to the public 
of Canterbury. The research has shown that globally, healthcare systems are struggling to gain 
support for any form of public participation in the election process (Lomas, Woods, & Veenstra, 
1997).  Martin (2008a, p. 36) went on to state:  
[P]ublic participation is seen to fall short of its promise to provide a direct, 
more-than-tokenistic, say in the governance of health to the public.   
With less support from the local population for local elections, the very validity of the elected 
representatives is being questioned by Governments (Baggott, 2005; Birchfield & Mueller, 2010). To 
further the idea of a fully appointed Board, Alexander and Lee (2006) looking at not for profit 
hospitals in the USA stated that:  
[H]ospitals governed by boards using a corporate governance model, 
versus hospitals governed by philanthropic-style boards, were likely to be 
more efficient.  
When looking at primary care groups (PCG) in the UK, the findings of the NHS highlighted that public 
Boards do not provide the guidance to the healthcare system that is expected, if anything all they 
did was to create a degree of uncertainty (Rowe & Shepherd, 2002). Pfeffer (1972) and Westphal 
and Zajac (1998) went on to claim that Boards are often ineffectual when it comes to making 
organisational decisions and the only role that may be left to the Board is representing the local 
population.  
Rewards for those elected to the present DHB positions are “modest” in comparison to the rewards 
paid within industry and this may be one reason for the lack of candidates with the suitable skills 
(Laugesen & Gauld, 2012, p. 11). With 96% of clinicians responding to the question “Do you think the 
Board should represent the local population?” answering Yes, there can be no doubt that public 
representation is seen as important for the Canterbury region, and presently this is achieved by the 
elected members. This was backed up with the response to the question on public influence in how 
the CDHB is run. Fifty-nine percent of the clinicians who responded felt that the public should have 
some (4) influence in the running of their DHB, yet 70% of respondents felt the present board 
structure is only an average (3) representation of the local population.   
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Katz, Conant, Inui, Baron, and Bor (2000) have introduced the idea of a council of elders acting as a 
conduit between clinicians and the community. Within the Canterbury region, the Pegasus PHO have 
replaced their elected Board in favour of a community Board made up of only appointed members 
selected from various business and healthcare professions. The introduction of the governments 
pharmacy and drug buying agency PHARMAC in 1993 is another sector of the New Zealand 
Healthcare industry that has a Board made up of only elected professionals (PHARMAC, 2016). The 
question of elected locals or appointed professionals may presently favour a move toward a Board in 
the same manner as that introduced by the Canterbury PHO, but by doing so this may also result in 
the removal of public participation that is seen as important by the clinicians working in the system.   
 
6.4 Centralised or Decentralised  
The objectives of this section of research was to explore the preference between a centralised 
healthcare system, the likes of the NHS, or the decentralised regional system with centralised input 
presently in place in New Zealand. The question about central or local management for healthcare, 
question 2.6, resulted in a response of 52% of those who replied to the question in favour of the 
present mixed structure compared to 48% of those who responded in favour of a locally, fully 
decentralised structure. These may figures would agree with the finding from Rico and Léon (2005) 
who pointed out that presently there is no solid conclusion about which system is clearly better, 
there is a small majority that favour the present decentralised system with centralised input.   
Question 1.9 asked if governance should be performed locally or centrally, resulting in a larger 
number of clinicians, 59% of those who answered, favouring a dual role consisting of both local and 
central input, compared to 37% in favour of a local governance and only 4% in favour of central 
governance. Although the results may be in line with the direction presently being taken by many 
other countries towards greater decentralisation (Bardhan, 2002; Magnussen et al., 2007), the same 
may not be the case in New Zealand as the number of regional healthcare centres  has decreased 
from 46 in 1925, to 20. This number may further reduce as the West Coast DHB is managed by the 
same CEO as the CDHB, and South Canterbury DHB is becoming more dependent on the CDHB with 
regards to speciality services and administrative systems. This more towards a greater regionalising 
of healthcare within New Zealand may work against the central concept introduced as part of the 
Health and Disabilities Act 2000 which set out community centred behaviour benefiting regions 
(Segall, 2000). Though this idea of greater delegation to smaller regions runs contrary to findings 
from Saltman (2008) who found that locally administered healthcare systems in Northern Europe 
85 
 
was one of the causes of inefficiency,  unacceptable and in many cases costly, duplication. It may be 
worth noting here the difference within New Zealand of greater regional accountability for 
healthcare and regionalisation. Regional accountability may be linked to the time when New Zealand 
had 48 different healthcare systems, each one being accountable to the people in the area the 
healthcare system managed. Whereas regionalisation may be viewed as a shift towards semi-
centralisation where the smaller districts are now being managed and governed by the greater 
regional areas. With ease of travel between rural areas and the larger cities, and the complexity and 
costs of managing some the smaller rural hospitals, New Zealand is seeing a shift toward the 
centralisation of specialist care. Yet the questionnaire result does highlight that a fully centralised 
system, like the NHS, is not one the clinicians in Christchurch hospital believe would fit within New 
Zealand. As 85% of clinicians who responded to the questionnaire have worked outside the New 
Zealand healthcare system, and 75% of those having spent time within the NHS, the question of 
centralisation or decentralisation would, from a clinical perspective, rule out centralisation along 
NHS lines. Liesbet and Gary (2003) study on “Unravelling the Central State” would support the idea 
of a move towards a mixture of central and regional input to governance, but how this multi-layered 
structure should be constructed is still uncertain. What has been seen since the Second World War is 
that many healthcare systems around the globe have been moving away from a fully centralised 
healthcare system towards greater regionalisation (Frankish et al., 2002).  
Looking at some of the results on the questionnaire about clinical say on MoH policy, 78% of those 
who responded believe greater clinical input is required. This was also the case for clinical input at 
the healthcare management level where 81% of those that responded believe there is a need for 
greater involvement by clinicians. Regardless of a centralised system run by the MoH from 
Wellington, or a decentralised regional system, clinicians are very much in favour of greater clinical 
input to the healthcare system as a whole. Though this input may be better coming from the Council 
of Medical Colleges rather than individual clinicians.  
The question around the leeway the CDHB has when implementing MoH policy gave a response of 
little (2) to average (3), which may highlight a degree of control by the central MoH over the present 
regional system. Expanding on this was the question of whether the MoH should have more or less 
say in how the CDHB is run. The response of those clinicians who answered, 59% said there was 
presently a balance, 33% believed they should have less influence and only 7% more. Looking at the 
results from the question on public input to the running of the CDHB, with 59% responding that the 
public should have greater input to the running of their DHB, this may be viewed as meaning the 
CDHB should have greater leeway when responding to central policy allowing the CDHB the 
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flexibility to respond to local conditions. When asked about the impact of MoH decisions on clinical 
practice 70% of respondents replied with little (2) to no impact (1). This result seems to agree with 
the findings put forward by Smith (1955, p. 59) that seems are true today as it was over 60 years 
ago:  
There is almost no administrative routine established in hospitals which 
cannot be (and frequently is) abrogated or countermanded by a physician 
claiming medical emergency – or by any one acting for the physician and 
similarly claiming medical necessity.  
If this is still the case, does it matter if the healthcare system is centralised or decentralised?  The 
question of centralisation or decentralisation for the CDHB does seem to suggest that a fully 
centralised system would not benefit the clinicians. At the same time clinicians do not agree that 
complete decentralisation is wise which seems to agree with the finding from Siggelkow and 
Levinthal (2003) that a fully centralised, nor fully decentralised structure results in a high performing 
healthcare system. Along with this is the view that a fully centralised structure will no longer allow 
for some form of public participation and in doing so may no longer have the flexibility to cater to 
local needs (Besley & Coate, 2003). Rico and Léon (2005) seem to summarise this well by saying that 
presently there is no definite conclusion on which system, centralised or decentralised, is more 
effective at delivering a national, publicly funded healthcare system.     
 
6.5 Public Participation 
The objectives of this section of research was to explore the needs in today’s modern healthcare 
system for public participation. From this study, public participation within the New Zealand 
Healthcare system is seen as important by the senior clinicians, but 70% of those who responded did 
so saying that the present Board members ranked as 3 on a rating of 1 to 5, regarding fair 
representation of the local population. Ninety-six percent of those who responded to question 1.2, 
did so saying that the Board should represent the local population and that the public must be at the 
for-front of the New Zealand district healthcare system. This agrees with findings by Barnard (1990), 
Coffee (1993), Jensen (1989) and Kosnik (1987) that local considerations should be taken into 
account by having public representation on Boards. Public representation does seem to be viewed as 
a foundation stone of the New Zealand publicly funded healthcare system, and is echoed by many 
other counties who also run publicly funded healthcare systems. Yet within New Zealand the Board 
of the CDHB is accountable in the first instance to the central Government and not the public who 
voted the for the elected Board members. Because of this dual line of accountability, the Board may 
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be viewed as a forum rubber stamping central Government directives rather than local 
representatives promoting local initiatives (Kemp, 2006; Laugesen & Gauld, 2012, p. 141). This view 
may actively work against the ideal that the general public are at the heart of a publicly funded 
healthcare system.    
From the questionnaire results, 59% of clinicians who responded that the public should have some 
influence over their DHB and how it is run, but these finding may disagree with those of Mitton et al. 
(2009) who highlighted that there is as yet, no agreement on when public participation should be 
sought regarding national or regional healthcare systems. This is backed by findings from Frankish et 
al. (2002) that there is a lack of evidence to show if public participation is needed within healthcare 
if central management teams are employed. Renedo and Marston (2011, p. 268) went on to say:  
Community participation is widely thought to be important in the 
improvement of healthcare delivery and in health equity. Yet there is little 
agreement about what 'participation' means in practice, or when it might 
be necessary. 
Yet this may contradict the statements by Barnard, Coffee, Jenson and Kosnit that public 
participation in the healthcare systems allows local considerations to be taken into account 
(Barnard, 1990; Coffee, 1993; Jensen, 1989; Kosnik, 1987).  How the public should be consulted or 
encouraged to participate is still being debated (Barnes et al., 2003). The present method of public 
engagement used by the DHB system may have two negative aspects, it may actually dissuade 
people with the required skill sets from the selection process (Laugesen & Gauld, 2012) and it may 
be discriminating or actively excluding sections of the public, public participation is supposed to 
represent (de Freitas & Martin, 2015).  
If Pegasus PHOs move towards community Boards working alongside public representatives was 
viewed in a similar manner as the council of elders proposed by Katz et al. (2000),  these community 
representatives may encourage those within the “special interest” or marginalised groups (Barnes et 
al., 2003; Pfeffer, 1995) that may be presently excluded within the selection process. But should this 
council of elders’ system be preferable, then the locally elected Board members’ positions become 
obsolete.   
Public participation is seen as important for the clinicians within the CDHB, but the limitations of this 
study means greater research is needed before defining how this participation could be changed and 
if in making any changes to the present participation method would also negate the need for a 
Board.   
88 
 
6.6 Chapter Summary   
Within the opening chapter, Section 1.4 raised four key questions, these were:  
 Should the system embrace greater centralisation or greater regionalisation? 
 Should the healthcare system be administered by a board or management?  
 Should the administrative governance team be elected or appointed?  
 What degree of public participation should there be within the public healthcare system?    
The next section uses the data and information gathered within this research to answer these 
questions.    
Should the system embrace greater centralisation or greater regionalisation? 
As highlighted in Section 3.2.4 “Centralisation or Decentralisation” there is no solid conclusion on 
which system is clearly better than any other (Rico & Léon, 2005). Centralisation with regional 
flexibility was the preferred approach in the 1990s (Sah & Stiglitz, 1991), but Magnussen et al. (2007) 
claimed that since the turn of the century, decentralisation is now seen as the strategy of choice. 
Many of these strategies are focused on healthcare systems in countries with a far greater 
population than New Zealand. Regionalisation that may be taking place within areas of Canada, 
could compare to centralisation within New Zealand. A good example being both Alberta and British 
Columbia, both of which have populations close to that of New Zealand (Government of Alberta, 
2015; Government of British Columbia, 2015). The population of the UK (Office for National 
Statistics, 2013) another country closely resembling New Zealand with a National Healthcare system, 
is nearly 14 times as large, runs a centralised system with regional input. Although 74% of the 
clinicians interviewed having worked within the NHS rated the present DHB regional system of New 
Zealand far better than the centralised system running in the UK.  
Introducing a semi centralised system has the potential to save New Zealand healthcare from the 
burden of duplication while opening up many areas to greater knowledge sharing within clinical and 
non-clinical departments, while still offering the flexibility to react to regional issues managed and 
monitored by region management teams. This may be viewed as a return to centralisation, but for 
many of the clinical and non-clinical systems and practices, the cost of running many decentralised 
silos’ is creating environments that could result in patients being put at risk.   
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Should the healthcare system be administered by a board or by management?  
The present structural, and management position for the CDHB is perceived as “being in a good 
place presently” (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #3, 2015). Management are responsive to clinical 
concerns, though this is always tempered with financial constraints. Management and the Board are 
seen as aiding clinicians and together are helping to improve the health of the public within the 
Canterbury district. For the Board, who are the representation of the public, and are an integral part 
of the CDHB structure, occasionally meeting and talking to the public may help them to better 
understand some of the frustrations, worries and concerns felt when people find themselves in 
hospital. For many, a hospital is an alien environment, and can very easily confuse and, or, disorient 
those that are already feeling a degree of stress (Laugesen & Gauld, 2012). 
The views of the clinical staff interviewed is positive with regards to the present Board and 
management. Working with management and clinical advisory groups has moved the CDHB from 
“The bad old days” seen in the 1990s to the position today where distributed leadership has helped 
to improve the overall strengths of the CDHB. To many the CDHB is now a place where “There is no 
management and clinicians, its clinical and non-clinical working in partnership” (Anonymous 
Healthcare Worker #4, 2015) and this seems to be one of the keys of success of the CDHB. Asking if 
the CDHB management could have made these changes without the Board, the answer would seem 
to be “Yes”. Much of the research points to the lack of direction from a public Board, which may 
mean that many of these administrational changes may have come from the managements teams in 
conjunction with the clinicians. If the Boards only role today is to represent the public, one question 
that still seems relevant is whether the makeup of the Board today may have implications for future 
generations?  
 
Should the administrative governance team be elected or appointed?  
There is an overwhelming belief that the Board should represent the local population and that the 
local population should have a say in how their DHB is run. Clinicians became vague when asked how 
this can be best achieved, especially if the present method, using the Board system can and does 
produces a balanced and fair representation of the local population. Boards were founded on the 
philanthropic style were each hospital had representatives from the local population, but as 
healthcare areas have expanded, larger areas have amalgamated with those small regions and the 
number of healthcare boards has been reduced, the ability of Boards to represent the local 
population has lessened. Since the earthquakes in 2011 the Board of the CDHB has spent more time 
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on the DHBs financial matters. This may point to a realignment along the lines of a corporate 
structure and away from the philanthropic style and in doing so the Board may be losing the ability 
to represent and promote local issues. This may open areas for future work to review how this 
greater public input to the running or management of the local DHB could be achieved. As 
highlighted earlier, replicating the move by the Canterbury Pegasus PHO to a fully appointed Board, 
along the lines of a council of appointed elders put forward by Katz et al. (2000) may seem more 
appropriate in the new millennium for a secondary healthcare system.  A fully appointed board 
would be able to bring their wealth of experience to the management table and help relive the sense 
of isolation presently facing senior healthcare management, while at the same time working closer 
with the community and reengaging with all sectors of the public, thus putting “Public” back into the 
public healthcare system. But the secondary healthcare system is very different from the primary 
healthcare system and a solution for one may not benefit the other.   
 
What degree of public participation should there be within the public healthcare system?    
With the turn out for the 2013 health Board elections being some of the lowest on record, Board 
elections may no longer be achieving the desired results gaining public support. Turnout for public 
healthcare elections in Canada and the UK, two counties that run a similar national healthcare 
model, are also falling. As the secondary service is a complex and highly specialised area of 
healthcare, following the lead of Pegasus, the Canterbury PHO, and opting for a fully appointed 
Board along the lines put forward by Katz et al. (2000), this may resolve the issue presently faced 
where the pool of elected members often results in a lack of knowledge and required skills to govern 
some of New Zealand’s largest organisation. A fully appointed Board in this manner may work closer 
with community organisation and in doing so regain public participation that is seen as import by the 
clinicians. This may see those sections of the community incorporated into the healthcare system 
that presently excludes them, and may result in a greater involvement of the public within the public 
healthcare system.  
In an era of medical care delivery systems, there is an increasing need for 
the patient's voice to be heard, for it to be invited, listened to, and taken 
seriously (Katz et al., 2000, p. 852).  
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6.7 Limitations  
The focus for this research was on the CDHB for a number of practical reasons. The research was 
carried out by only one person, expanding this to other hospitals or other District Health Boards was 
prohibited by time and travel costs. The CDHB is unique in that other DHBs are not likely to operate 
in the same manner nor have the same managerial challenges. As one of the largest of the 20 DHB’s 
in New Zealand its scope is greater than most of the others, it is more comprehensive in terms of the 
number of people it might serve, and because of its status as a “super board”, in the sense that its 
administration covers far more ground than just Canterbury and incorporates the activities of 
smaller, regional boards. Due to the size of the Christchurch Hospital campus, and its association 
with the Otago School of Medicine, all specialist departments found within the South Island of New 
Zealand are represented within the Christchurch hospital. Because of this many of the Christchurch 
clinicians also manage outreach clinic in the other South Island DHBs. Expanding the research and 
interview schedule to other South Island DHBs may have resulted in duplication as well as a greater 
degree of data saturation.       
 
6.8 Future Research  
One of the contributions of this paper are the questions these findings raise for further research. 
This has highlighted two distinct areas that could be researched in greater detail.  
1. How does public input within a highly complex, highly specialised secondary healthcare 
system validate public healthcare?  
2. Do publicly elected Boards create a level of conflict when they are perceived to validate 
public healthcare by representing the local public, while contradicting the needs of a Board? 
This research has shown that clinicians view public input as being important within a public 
healthcare service, yet presently the method in place within the Canterbury District Health Board is 
not viewed as achieving these desired results. The elected members of a DHB Board are seen as the 
most appropriate manner in which public input to the New Zealand healthcare system can be 
achieved, the election system is seen by those working within the healthcare service as failing to 
provide a fair representation of the general public. The elected members of the Board are often 
viewed by management as failing to provide the required skill sets needed to govern the healthcare 
system, leaving healthcare management working in a vacuum. There may be a perception that 
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public input validates a public healthcare system, but this seems to contradict the need for a skilled 
Board to govern and provide guidance to the healthcare management teams. 
Further research could be undertaken looking at a more effective way to gain greater patient and 
public input to the CDHB. This could centre on the changes made within the primary healthcare 
sector within Canterbury, as well as looking at how other healthcare organizations around the world 
have tried to gain public input to healthcare and healthcare management. For any public healthcare 
system, trying to get the input of the public is a challenge.      
If a Board is the desired manner of achieving public input to the local healthcare sector, who are the 
best people to promote to the Board, and how should they be appointed. Should the appointments 
be made by a central agency, the likes of the Ministry of Health, or should the senior clinicians and 
management team have some input to the final decisions.  
The creation of a centralised administration systems spanning all DHBs would also allow better 
access to patient information for those clinicians work in different hospitals or regions. The 
centralisation of payroll systems, purchasing and distribution also has the ability to save the DHB 
system money while reducing duplication and waste that may be present in the existing regional 
system. A centralised administration systems would improve the visibility of clinical and 
administrative information and thus allow the right information to be presented to the right person 
at the right time regardless of location. But any more towards greater centralisation with regional 
flexibility must not be seen as a return to the system in place during the 1990s as this may run the 
risk of losing the support of the very people who work within the system.  
More research is needed on alternative structures that facilitate public input in an effective manner. 
Lastly the following comment highlights any changes made to the healthcare system must have 
clinical support.  
Do not change or reorganise for the sake of re-organising as clinical staff 
are very much against restructures / re-organisation, as this has a tendency 
to adversely affect patient care (Anonymous Healthcare Worker #5, 2015). 
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Appendix A 
Questionnaire 
Thesis Question 
What is the impact of the CDHB structure on the efficiency and efficacy of clinical operations?   
 
 
Questions 
First, I would like to ask you about the CDHB Board and your relationship with it.  
1.1 Do you have any synergy with the Board?                   No       Yes  
 If yes, to what benefit?               No benefit  1  2  3  4  5  Very Beneficial 
 
 
1.2 Do you think the Board needs to represent the local population?        No       Yes 
Why? 
 
1.3 Do you think the elected Board members are a fair representation of the local population?  
             Not representative 1  2  3  4  5 Completely representative 
 Do you think this could be changed and if so how? 
   
1.4 How good is the Board at managing the delivery of healthcare?    Poor  1  2  3  4  5  Excellent  
 
 
1.5 Should the Board be primarily concerned with Supervising the delivery of Healthcare,    
Monitoring the delivery of healthcare, or Something else? 
 
 
1.6 Do you think the Board enhances efficient practice of the CDHB?      No      Yes     Don’t Know 
 If yes, how: If not why not?  
 
 
1.7 Do you think the governance role should be performed by elected locals, or appointed 
experts                                     Elected   Appointed   Both   Not at all    
Why?  
 
1.8 Do you think the governance role should be performed by a Board or management? 
                               Board   Management 
Why?  
 
1.9 Do you think the governance role should be performed locally or centrally?  
                                               Locally   Centrally   Both 
Why?  
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Next I would like to ask you about the CDHB management  
2.1 Do you meet with CDHB management?          No       Yes  
 If yes, how often?               Daily  Weekly  Fortnightly  Monthly   Quarterly   Longer 
 If yes, about what?                Clinical  Operational  Personnel  Something else 
 
 
2.2 How effective is DHB management at the delivery of Healthcare to Canterbury? 
                Not effective 1  2  3  4  5 Very effective  
 
 
2.3 Do you think the present management structure is effective managing clinical operations? 
                                     Not effective 1  2  3  4  5 Very effective 
Do you think this could be changed and if so how? 
 
2.4 Do you think clinician’s should have a greater role in Healthcare management?        No     Yes 
If yes, why: If no, why not?  
                
      
2.5 In your experience, are management responsive to clinical concerns?   
                      Unresponsive 1  2  3  4  5 Totally responsive  
 
 
2.6  Do you think Healthcare for Canterbury should be managed locally, or centrally    
                                     Locally  Centrally   Mixed 
Why?  
 
 
  
Next I would like to ask you about the Ministry of Health  
 
3.1 How much influence do you have on healthcare policy created by the MoH?   
                    No influence  1  2  3  4  5  Great Influence 
 
 
3.2 Do you think clinician’s should have a greater say in MoH policy decisions?         No      Yes 
Why? 
 
 
3.3 How much leeway does the DHB have when implementing MoH policy?    
                                             None   1  2  3  4  5 Great Leeway  
 
3.4 Do you think the MoH should have less, or more say in how the CDHB prioritises clinical 
initiatives?                                          Less     More    There is a balance at present   
 
 
3.5  How much impact does the MoH have on your clinical decisions?  
 None  1  2  3  4  5  complete control 
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Next I would like to ask you about Public Engagement  
 
4.1  Should the public have any influence in how their DHB is run?        
            No influence  1  2  3  4  5  Great Influence  
Do you think this could be changed and if so how?  
 
   
4.2 Do you think the Board chamber is the best place for a public debate on healthcare? 
              No       Yes  
 
 
 
Next I would like to ask you about your experience of different Health models 
 
5.1 Have you worked solely in New Zealand?             No       Yes 
Yes go to 5.2 
Where else have you worked                                               _______________________ 
 
Compared to the counties you have worked in: 
 
Which healthcare model is better suited to you                 _______________________ 
   
How does the DHB model compare                Less effective 1  2  3  4  5 Very effective 
 
   
5.2 How effective is the DHB model at delivering optimum healthcare for Christchurch?  
                         Not effective  1  2  3  4  5 Very effective 
 Do you think this could be changed and if so how? 
           
 
   
Finally, I would like to ask a couple of personal questions 
 
6.1 How old are you         _____ years 
 
6.2 What ethnic group do you identify with?      ________________ 
 
6.3  Gender                   Male     Female 
 
6.4 In what country did you first qualify as a Doctor      ________________ 
 
6.5 How long have you worked for the CDHB?     _____ years 
   
 
 
Conclusion  
This completes our interview.  
 
Thank you for taking the time to answer these questions.  
 
Do you have any comment you would like to add?   
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Appendix B 
Invitation to Participate 
CONFIDENTIAL  
(Name of Participant)  
(Title/Position)  
(Specialty)  
Christchurch Public Hospital  
Date (DD MM YYYY)  
Dear (Prof. Dr. Mr. Mrs.)  
Invitation to Participate in Master Research  
I am seeking your assistance with my study on the relevance of the Board to the efficient and 
efficacious clinical operation of Canterbury District Health, as part of my Master’s Degree in 
Commerce and Management at Lincoln University.  
By interviewing Senior Medical Officers from the majority of the specialist areas within the 
Christchurch Hospital, this study aims to gain a better understanding of the relevance of a Board 
viewed by the clinician’s. How the Board may affect the specialist departments within the hospital, 
and if the Board is in fact still required in the modern health system with moves towards greater 
regionalisation, and a perception of centralisation within healthcare management.  
 
Further information about the research is attached in the following three documents:  
 Research information sheet for participants  
 Interview schedule  
 Consent form  
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Proposed benefits of the research  
This research provides an opportunity for clinicians to make comments regarding the relevance, 
practicality and operational effectiveness of the Board of the CDHB from their perspectives and 
based on their practical experience. It is hoped that the results of this study will be of benefit to 
District Health Board management, the Government, and other key stakeholders, all of whom are 
concerned in one way or another with Government policy in healthcare management.  
The interview procedure  
Participation involves an interview of about half an hour to an hour, on an agreed date and time in 
November or December. The information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and your 
anonymity with your answers will be preserved. Your transcript will be assigned a random four-digit 
code. The list associating your name with the code will be stored in a secure and separate location 
and no one other than the researcher will have access to this list. Once the data collection and 
quality control processes are complete, the list will be destroyed.  
Participation  
If you agree to be interviewed, please complete and sign the consent form and return it to me 
before (the end of) October 2014 in the envelope provided.  
I will contact you to arrange an interview time and place after receiving your consent form.  
If you have any questions or would like further information, please contact me on mobile 0274 792 
894 or by email at sheardd@lincoln.an.nz   
Alternately you may contact my supervisor Dr Greg Clydesdale at Greg.Clydesdale@lincoln.ac.nz  or 
my associate supervisors Dr David Cohen at David.Cohen@lincoln.ac.nz or Dr Gillis Maclean at 
Gillis.Maclean@lincoln.ac.nz     
I look forward to hearing from you and thank you in advance for your support.  
Yours sincerely,  
John Sheard   
MCM Student  
Commerce Division  
Lincoln University 
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Appendix C 
Research Information Sheet 
Lincoln University 
Commerce Division 
Research Information Sheet for Participants 
You are invited to participate as a subject in a Commerce Master’s thesis project entitled:  
What is the impact of the CDHB structure on the efficiency and efficacy of clinical operation? 
The aim of this project is to gain a better understanding of the relevance of a Board. How the Board 
may affect the specialist departments within the hospital, if the Board is in fact still required in the 
modern health system. With moves towards greater regionalisation and a perception of 
centralisation within healthcare management, is a local Board irrelevant.  
Your participation in this project will involve an interview that is estimated to take between half an 
hour, to an hour of your time.  
Background to the research  
Upon entering power in 1990, National drew up bold plans to reform not only the health sector, but 
also the welfare state. Between December 1990 and July 1991, actions were taken to see the 
dismantling of the Area Health Boards, and replace these with a system of competing hospitals. This 
introduction of hospital competition was expected to reduce the role of Government in the health 
system, while increasing efficiency, proving a greater choice to the general public, while also 
increasing hospitals responsiveness to the consumers. The Honourable Simon Upton, Minister of 
Health, introduced the health reform bill on the 30th July 1991; the day after the Government had 
removed all the health systems elected Boards. For the first time in healthcare history, all hospitals 
in New Zealand now operated without a Board.  
This decision to centralise the health system was eventually overturned in 2000, after the Labour 
Party, led by Helen Clarke, managed to out poll National 38% to 30%.  The incoming Labour / 
Alliance Government reintroduced locally elected Boards back into the health system governance 
model.  At the time, the Labour led Governments rational for decentralising the health system was 
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the same message used for the past 100 years. ‘Local decision making structures facilitates closeness 
to the community’ (Gauld, 2001). 
The results of the project will be published and data may be used in future research. If you answer 
the interview questions it will be understood that you have consented to participate in the project 
and consent to publication of the results of the project with the understanding that anonymity will 
be preserved. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality the following steps will be taken:  
At no stage of the interviews will any participant be identified.  
Participation is voluntary and you may withdraw your participation at any time prior to the 
completion of the interview. Once the interviews are complete it will not be possible to withdraw as 
all interviews are anonymous.  
You do not have to answer any question that you do not wish to. 
The project is being carried out by John Sheard, a postgraduate student from the Commerce Division 
at Lincoln University. He will be pleased to discuss any concerns you have about participation in the 
project. Contact details are: mobile 0274 792 894 or via email to sheardd@lincoln.ac.nz  
Supervisors for this research are Dr Greg Clydesdale Greg.Clydesdale@lincoln.ac.nz,  with associate 
supervisors, Dr David Cohen David.Cohen@lincoln.ac.nz and Dr Gillis Maclean  
Gillis.Maclean@lincoln.ac.nz    
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Appendix D 
Interview Schedule 
What is the impact of the CDHB structure on the efficient and efficacious clinical operation? 
Pre-interview Information  
Interviewer:     John Sheard  
Date of Interview:            _______________   Time of Interview: ____h:____m 
Interview Location: Christchurch Public Hospital or The Boatshed café   
Gender:   Male     Female  
Introduction  
Hi… This study focuses on the relevance of the Board for the District Health Board structure, with 
emphasis placed on Christchurch hospital. In particular, I am interested in the clinician’s view 
regarding the Board, its relevance, and operational practicality, and what the impacts are on the day 
to day working environment for clinician’s since the Board was re-introduced in 2000.  
Purpose  
The information from this interview will be very helpful in gathering data on perceptions of the 
relevance of a Board from a clinician’s perspective, and will be a key part of my research. The 
information you provide will be held in the strictest confidence, and only used for this research.  
I would like to record the interview on tape to speed up the note-taking procedure. The tape will 
simply have a number to identify who was interviewed and will be destroyed after the data has been 
analysed. Are you happy with this?  
Instructions  
I'd like to ask you some questions about the role of the District Health Boards Board of governance.  
What, if any, form of governance the Board play within the District Health Board? How much leeway 
the Board have when dealing with national health directives? Do you think this type of governance is 
till relevant given your experience in healthcare? Do you believe the Board has any relationship to 
local population? 
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Appendix E 
Consent Form 
Name of Project:  
What is the impact of the CDHB structure on the efficient and efficacious clinical operation? 
I have read and understood the description of the above-named project. On this basis I agree to 
participate as a subject in the project. I understand that participation will involve an anonymous 
interview that will be tape recorded. I consent to publication of the results of the project with the 
understanding that anonymity will be preserved. I understand that I may not withdraw my consent 
once the interview has been completed.  
 
Name:  ____________________________________________________________________                                                                                 
 
Email Address:  _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Contact Telephone Number:  __________________________________________________ 
 
Signed:  _____________________________________ 
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Appendix F 
Prompt Cards 
1.1 
 
Do you have any synergy with the Board? 
 
No benefit      1  2  3  4  5     Very Beneficial 
 
 
1.2 
 
Do you think the Board needs to represent the local population? 
 
No       Yes 
 
 
1.3 
 
Do you think the elected Board members are a fair representation of the local population? 
 
Not representative     1  2  3  4  5     Completely representative 
 
 
1.4 
 
How effective is the Board at managing the delivery of healthcare? 
 
Poor     1  2  3  4  5     Excellent 
 
 
1.5 
 
Should the Board be primarily concerned with Supervising the delivery of Healthcare, 
 
Monitoring  the delivery of healthcare, or  Something else? 
 
 
 
1.6 
 
Do you think the Board enhances efficient practice of the CDHB? 
 
No      Yes     Don’t Know 
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1.7 
 
Do you think the governance role should be performed by elected locals, or appointed experts? 
 
Elected     Appointed     Both   Not at all 
 
 
1.8 
 
Do you think the governance role should be performed by a Board or management? 
 
Board     Management 
 
 
1.9 
 
Do you think the governance role should be performed locally or centrally? 
 
Locally     Centrally     Both 
 
 
2.1 
 
Do you meet with CDHB senior management? 
 
If yes, how often? 
 
Daily    Weekly    Fortnightly    Monthly     Quarterly     Longer 
 
If yes, about what? 
 
Clinical    Operational    Personnel    Something else 
 
 
2.2 
 
How effective is DHB management at the delivery of Healthcare to Canterbury? 
 
Not effective      1  2  3  4  5       Very effective 
 
 
2.3 
 
Do you think the present management structure is effective managing clinical operations? 
 
Not effective     1  2  3  4  5     Very effective 
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2.4 
 
Do you think clinician’s should have a greater role in Healthcare management? 
 
No     Yes 
 
 
2.5 
 
In your experience, are management responsive to clinical concerns? 
 
Unresponsive     1  2  3  4  5      Totally responsive 
 
 
2.6 
 
Do you think Healthcare for Canterbury should be managed locally, or centrally? 
 
Locally      Centrally     Mixed 
 
 
3.1 
 
How much influence do you have on healthcare policy created by the MoH? 
 
No influence    1  2  3  4  5    Great Influence 
 
 
3.2 
 
Do you think clinician’s should have a greater say in MoH policy decisions? 
 
No      Yes 
 
 
3.3 
 
How much leeway does the DHB have when implementing MoH policy? 
 
None      1  2  3  4  5     Great Leeway 
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3.4 
 
Do you think the MoH should have less, or more say in how the CDHB prioritises clinical  
 
initiatives? 
 
Less       More      There is a balance at present 
3.5 
 
How much impact does the M.o.H. have on your clinical decisions? 
 
None      1  2  3  4  5     complete control 
 
 
4.1 
 
Should the public have any influence in how their DHB is run? 
 
No Influence     1  2  3  4  5      Great Influence 
 
 
4.2 
 
Do you think the Board chamber is the best place for a public debate on healthcare? 
 
No       Yes 
 
 
5.1 
 
How does the DHB model compare to other healthcare systems? 
 
Less effective     1  2  3  4  5     Very effective 
 
 
5.2 
 
How effective is the DHB model at delivering optimum healthcare for Christchurch? 
 
Not effective     1  2  3  4  5    Very effective 
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Simple pictorial layout for the Likert scale questions. 
 
 
 
                  1                                  2                                  3                                4                                    5 
      Poor                    Fair                Average                Good                Excellent 
   Never                Seldom          Sometimes             Often                 Always 
  Not Effective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Very Effective 
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Appendix G 
DHB Facts and Figures 
(Ministry of Health, 2013) 
 
